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PHEFACK
The purpose of this tbeais 1» to examine the major
teat of collective security that eaise up In the League of
Nation»#

Prior to the Italo-Ethiopian conflict* the League

had oscillated between eucce»» and faulure* but in 1935 the
member» realized that the continued deterioration of the
international situation required the League to take a stand*
If it should prove incapable of dealing with this crisis*
then the principles of the Covenant would be swept away
by political opportun!4jiu.

Ihe desire that the League should

succeed was for the most part a genuine one* but the desire
to avert a war and the desire to avert wars are not neo**
e s s w i l y the same*

And that difference was significant in

the League»® failure to halt Italy#

The machlnatione of

European politics overwhelmed the Covenant* and onoe again
the idealists fell before the politicians*
Deservingly or not* the League received a bad name
for this failure#

In an age when the United ^>tlons has

inherited the task of maintaining the peace* the lessons
gained from the Italo-Kthiopian conflict retr,in their
validity#
In studying the aotluus of the League of Natioiis*
one thing stands out#

International organizations* as they
11

Ill
have axl&ted, rely as much on a common will to maintain
themselves as they do on thslr constituted authority*

If

the League failed where the United Nations has not, it was
because of the lack of this will in the former, and not be
cause the latter is a better constituted organisation#
Given the same conditions under which the League operated,
there le little evidence that the United Uatlone would en«*
joy any more success than its predecessor*

In comparing

the League of îîatlcna with the United Kations, one signi
ficant difference is the degree of a will to succeed a»iong
their respective memberships.

This was the only innovation

In the United Nations actions in Korea, but it was enough
to halt an act of aggression*
This thesis then will recount the history of the
Italo-Ethiopian conflict as It concerned the League of
Illations# and from this certain conclusions will be drawn,
Since It is not the intention to recall the history of the
entire dispute, but only the actions taken by the League
to reach a settlement# many of the outside political con
siderations will not be discussed*

When these had a pro

found influence on the actions of the Letigue# they will be
mentioned# but the inadequacy of sources precluded all but
a minimum of interpretation.
The main sources of information consisted of the

iv
various official publications of the League of Nations*
auch as the Official Journal and the various supplementa
to It,

Documenta on International Affairs, published

by the Royal Institute of International Affaira# has been
a helpful source for material not Included In the League
of Nations publications# but because this thesis deals
primarily with the League# the great bulk of the infor
mation comes from the League records#
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OHAJPTEH I
GSIJKRAL COnSIDEI^ATICKS
The Position

the League of Nrtions#

This study

will deal with the manner and degree in whiob the princi
ple of collective security was followed out and utilised
by the League in the italo-Ethiopian Conflict*

Although

this was not the first threat to the peace that confronted
the League of Nations^ it was the first instance In which
an attempt was made to implement the use of sanctions af
ter declaring r. member of the organization to be an aggres
sor.
The League was standing on rather shaky foundations
before this dispute had arisen, and, at events later shoved,
this particular incident was largely responsible for even
more serious shocks and tremors that contributed to Its
eventual collapse.

As originally envisioned by its found

ers, all of the leading powers of the world were expected
to be members, but by 1935 many of Its chairs ware vacant.
The United States had never accepted the principles of the
Covenant, and others lÆkO had once subscribed to them were
now absent,

Germany and Japan had withdrawn, and growing

doubts and a lack of faith were causing others to consider

the same step*

More than anything else, this vas because

the League had proved Itself to be Incapable of dealing
effectively with those larger powers who had In one way or
another contested the League<s prerogatives#

This caused

a valid concern among many of the small powers and did much
to destroy their faith in It*
In 1920 it had been unable to check foland^s seizure
of Vilna; in 1923 It had not halted the Italian occupation
of Corfu; and even more damning was its failure to take a
stand in the Japanese invasion of Manchuria In 1931 and
the Korth China province of Jehol two years later#
This time the League would be dealing with Italy*
a state that* very recently at least* had been exercising
considerable force within Its chambers#

It is little

wonder that the members were hesitant to grapple with the
dispute and risk another failure*

They realised* however*

that the survival of the Covenant depended on success In
treating with the aggressor*

It was undoubtedly felt that

there might not be another chance should there be failure*
Pew would have the necessary faith to trust the League to
maintain the peace another time#
The Position of Italy#

Fascist Italy was well aware

of this concern* but seemed to feel from past events that
she would not be unduly hindered by the League*

Italy,

by courtesy if not In fact* was a great power within the
organisation^

Thia^ oombined with the realisation th^t

the League waa more interested in European affairs than
in a backward country In Africa, prompted Mussolini to
take the gamble*
Why did Mussolini feel it necessary to extend
Italian suzerainty over Ethiopia?

It waa probably a com-»

blnatlon of factors— psychological# économie# and political**
These are the usual motives for expansion, and Italy on this
occasion felt that these justified her aggression*
The population of Italy was dense# and the expedient
method of alleviating this problem seemed to lie in colo*
nialism*

By this measure# the talents of the immigrants

would not be lost to the mother country*

Italy's economic

structure was unstable at the time# partly because of world
economic conditions# and the transporting of a segment of
the population seemed a wise solution*

Secondly# if the

colonial area should at the same time be a depository of
varied resources, an added benefit would acrmie*
Thirdly, with this same type of rationalization#
Italy saw an added advantage in an acquisitive policy*

<)he

^Arnold J# Toynbee# Survey of International Affairs#
Abyssinia and Italy# 1935# Vol. II# (London: Oxford Univer
sity Press# 1.936)# p* 12#

felt additional territory would enhance her International
at&ndlng^ and she «till harbored an imredresaed grievance
over her small share In the spoil» of World War I*

Italy

had heén given to believe# by Great Britain and France^
that at the successful conclusion of the war she would be
awarded extensive territories In Africa.

All Italy had been

able to extract# however# were minor boundary adjustments#
which had left a definite feeling of resentment over this
unfulfilled pledge#

But under the leadership of Mussolini#

Italy seemed bn the verge of correcting what was considered
a great injustice*
Lastly# there were two predominant psychological
motives*

It was felt that what Italy would be doing in

the twentieth century would not be greatly different from
what Great Britain and France had done in the prooodirg
century*

Why should Ital> be chastised now for the same

behavior recently exhibited by established imperialist pow*»
era who had alreidy acquired overseas areas?

While arguing

that France as recently as 1931: had completed her control
over Morocco# the Italians lost sight of the fact that the
type of territorial gain they were contemplating was no
longer pblitlcally acceptable#
The second psychological motive evolved from the
past relations between Italy and Ethiopia#

At the end of

the nlnateeifitli century» &t the time of the first military
aggression Italy launched against Ethiopia» the latter had
defeated an Italian contingent at Adowa#

Mussolini onoe

said that this ^wound to the Italian heart” must be healed
once and for all.
Relations between Italy and Ethiopia»

In the twen

ties» Italy had tried a policy of friendship to achieve
her ends» and» ironically» it had been largely duo to
Italian support that Ethiopia had been admitted into the
League of Nations*

In a further attempt to obtain a fav

ored position, Italy had signed a Treaty of Friendship,
Conciliation» and Arbitration with Ethiopia in 1928#

Pre-*

liminary steps were worked out to improve trade between the
two countries through the Italian colonies of Eritrea and
Italian Somaliland» and Italy felt she would soon enjoy a
favored economic position in Ethiopia,

There were provi

sions for road construction and Ethiopian use of a free
zone in the Italian port of Aaab#

But for some reason

Ethiopia did not choose to take advantage of these treaty
provisions» to the great annoyance of Italy,

?

By 1933 a change had occurred in the Italian policy
toward Ethiopia,

Seeing that economic penetration was going

^F, r* Walters, A History of the Leap^e of Nations,
Vol. II» Royal Institute oTTETSrn&tional Affairs, IfLondon:
Oxford University Press, 1952), p, 62l|,

to \>à difficult# If not inqpoesible# thereby lesae Ing the
chance for political control# Kuaaollnl turned toward the
Idea of a railltary conquest#

According to his later mili

tary commander# do Bono# who headed the Invasion of Ethiopia
In 1935# by 1933 Kusôollnl had decided war would be the
only successful mesna of gaining control over Ethiopia#^
From that time on relations between Ethiopia and Italy be**
gon to disintegrate# which caused both to prepare for war#
Fearing a military attack on his country by the Italians#
Halle Selassie askeo for an Italian reaffirmation of the
Treaty of Friendship#

On September 30# 193l|# the two gov

ernments Issued a joint communique In which both reiterated
their promises to cultivate friendly relations as a means
of Augmenting reciprocal political and economic relations#^^
In light of the continued Italian military prepa
rations# this proved to be nothing more than a hollow pledge#
Mussolini realised the increased difficulty of concealing
his military buildup in the two Italian colonies, and some
pretext was needed to Justify the continuation of this

^Emilio de Bono# Anno XIIÎÎI: the Conquest of r.n
Empire# (London: Crescent Ire»®# 1937)# pp# 13-17. Cited
By f7 P# Walters# A El story of the Leaf^ue of Nations# Vol*
II# Royal Institute of Into rn at1c n al Affairs# (London: Ox
ford University Press# 1952)# p# 6Zk*
^Elizabeth P# HAcCallma# Rivalries in Ethiopia#
World Affairs Pamphlet No# 12# (New fork aniT^Boston; World
Peace Foundation# 1935)# p# l]l#

policy#
The Wal Wal Dispute and Arbltratioh»

Hla excuse

came within two months of the September 30 communique, with
the incident at Wal Wal between Italian and Ethiopian
troops#
Wal Wal lies in what was a disputed area between
Italian Somaliland and the Ethiopian province of Ogaden#
Most of the boundary between Ethiopia and the Italian colo**
nies of Eritrea and Somaliland had never been delimited,
and border clashes had been frequent#

Wal Wal was the

sight of a number of wells and, although it waa occupied
by the Italians, a number of official Italian maps placed
the boundary several miles to the east#

But the Ethiopian

Government had not protested the presence of the Italians,
and there had never been trouble in this area#^
This particular incident occurred on December S,
193h#

An Anglo-Ethiopian boundary commission thajt had

been working on the boundary between Ethiopia and British
Somaliland had arrived at the area several days earlier,

A

misunderstanding developed between the Ethiopian troops ac^
companying the commission and the Italian garrison at the
wells, and tempers began to run high on both sides#

The

British personnel evacuated the area to avoid involvement.

5

Walters, p# 626#

but the Ethiopians and Italians began bringing up reinforce-^
ments#

Finally, on the fifth, the inevitable shot was fired

and an earnest battle ensued.

The Italians were finally

able to push the Ethiopians back, but not until both sides
had suffered casualties larger than usually involved in
these clashes.
On hearing of the incident, the Italian Government
dispatched a protest to Addis Ababa, demanding apologies
and compensations.

The Italian oommander at Wal Wal was to

be given a formal apology, the Italian flag waa to be salut
ed, a monetary sum was to be paid to the Italians for loss
of life, and the attackers were to be punishod.

6

The Government at Addis Ababa waa not prepared to
accept these demands on this occasion because it felt that
the area in which the disputes occurred had been in Ethiopian
territory.

Instead, the Ethiopian Government wished to place

the entire matter under the Jurisdiction of Article 5 of
the Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation, and Arbitration of

1928, By its terms# both countries had agreed to submit
any matters that could not be settled by normal diplomatic
means to arbitration or conciliation#^

^League of Nations, Council, Official Journal,
February, 1935# (Geneve! League of Nations, 1935), 'p'p#
272-73# Cited hereafter as L*N.O.J*»

7Ibid.. p* 272.

Such a step did not meet with Italian approval, how
ever# because the Italian Government saw this as the pre
text needed to justify its militant plans.

On December 1^#

the Italians officially refused to submit the dispute to
the terms of the treaty# InslFtlng that In this particular
ease there was no question of responsibility.

The only

solution acceptable to Italy would be for Ethiopia to ac
knowledge the demands put forth in the Italian protest.^
When the Ethiopian Government received this reply#
a telegram was immediately dispatched to the SecretaryGeneral of the League of Eatlons#

It called the Leaguers

attention to the gravity of the situation and accused the
g
Italians of recent aerial bombardment of Ethiopian land#
In the note there waa no request for the issue to be placed
on the Council*s agenda# although such a reservation was
made in the event that the dispute could not be settled
between Italy and Ethiopia.
The Italian Government then countered by sending
its own version of the incident to the League of Katiens#
and during the next two weeks both governments submitted
more detailed reports#

The Italians insisted that the

^Ibid., pp, 273-7U.
p, 27k,

10
matter could be settled by direct diplomatic means, but con-*
tinned to insist that the settlement be on their terms*
The Ethiopian Government stated, in a telegram sent to the
League on December 31, th%t it would meet these demands If
an arbitration commission should find Ethiopia responsible,
but steadfastly refused to give in to any such demands until
the matter was submitted to arbitration*^^
During this time the Italian Government had in**
creased the tempo of its military preparations, and Haile
Selassie decided that the impasse must be broken for the de-*
fense of Ethiopia*

On January 3, 193$, he requested that

the entire issue be placed on the agenda of the League
Council, through the provisions of Article 11 of the
11
Covenant#
It was January 17# however# before the Council
placed the item on its agenda# and by the nineteenth, when
it came up for discussion, the two governments had agreed
to direct negotiations under the provisions of the Treaty
of Friendship#

In order to keep the League from becoming

June, 193‘
J, p. 727.
^^Acoording to thl« Article, any threat of war waa
declared a concern of the League# which was to take what
ever action it considered necessary in order to maintain
the peace* Any member had the right to bring any euch
matters before the Assembly or the Council* For full text
see Appendix# p# 122.

IX
Involved In the leeue# Italy dropped her demands for apolo
gies and compensations^

But soon after these direct talks

opened $ it became evident thf)t the two sides were not yet
ready to reconcile their differences#

The Ethiopians in

sisted that the actual ownership of Wal Wal should be con
sidered in order to determine responsibility, but the
Italians were not ready to concede this imch*

The nego

tiations resulted in a deadlock which it was to the advan
tage of Italy to maintain#

Thus, as the talks continued,

the military buildup in the Italian colonies waa carried on.
Haile Selassie realiaod th«t the Italians were gaining a
great advantage, and Insisted that the matter must be sub
mitted to arbitration#

This was refused by the Italians,

who insisted that according to the Treaty of 1928, arbi
tration would not be used until all direct efforts to reach
a settlement had proved futile.

As far as they were con

cerned, this was not yet the case.
Finally, out of patience with the Italian», the
Bxqperor of Ethiopia again turned to the League of Nations,
and on March 17 requested that the entire dispute be placed
before the Council on the basis of Article 15 of the Covenant#

12

The Italians were charged with continuing their

12

According to this Article, any dispute between
members that was not settled or submitted to arbitration or
judicial settlement, was to be aubsdtted to the Council# The

12
mobilisation of troops and material In the Italian colo
nies, while refusing to enter Into any sincere negotia-'
tions to bring about a settlement of the Wal Wal dispute#
Ethiopia, finding herself with.no other alternative for her
defense, considered It absolutely necessary to ask the Coun
cil to investigate the dispute*^^
The Italian reply, which came on Karch 22, denied
that the dispatch of troops to the Italian colonies consti
tuted any threat to the peace#

Italy waa merely taking

steps for the defense of these areas#

Furthermore, Italy

had been waking every effort to achieve a just settlement,
the reply continued, and had recently put forth fresh pro
posals#

In the event this phase of the negotiations should

fall, however, Italy would accede to Ethiopians request
that the matter be submitted to arbitration and cooperate
in establishing an arbitration commission#

In view of this

promise, the Italian Govamment considered the matter out
side of the application of Article 15# and insisted that any
attempt to implement th%t article would be improper#

Council waa then to attempt to work out a settlement agree
able to both parties# If this was not possible, then the
Council was to submit a report to the members recommending
what it considered to be Just and proper actions# For full
text, see Appendix# p# 1 2 3 .
Kay, 193?, p. 572*
pp. 577-7Ü.

13
Ethiopians appeal to have the Council consider the
dispute was justified in view of the Italien obstructions
to the negotiations, but the Council did not honor tho re
quest#

Unfortunately for Ethiopia, 0e;many at this time

announced her intentions to raise an array by conscription,
and the powers in the League wore more oonoerned with that
ominous situation th&n with the Wal Wal dispute#

There was

little désiré to alienate Mussolini by considering the dis
pute under Article 15# when there waa some hope that the
two might finally resort to arbitration#

At the Stress Con-

forenpe, which was called to discuss German rearmament.
Great Britain and France remained officially silent on the
African issue, which indicated to Mussolini that he would
have his way#^^
Thus Ethiopia experienced her first defeat in the
League, because politics took precedence over the princi
ples of the Covenant#

And, even if the smaller powers in

the League had desired to see the dispute referred to Arti
cle 15, they could have done notching without the support of
either Great Britain or France#
The Government at Addis Ababa waé Saot fbéle^ by the
promises In the Italian note of March 22 that Italy woujLd
agree to arbitration.

On March 29, Halle Selassie dispatched

^^Walters, p# 632*

XU
another note to the League^ in which It waa charged that
the Italian proposals would be another occasion for delay#
during which time the military threat to Ethiopia would be
increased»

Restating that the League would be Ethiopia’s

defense from Italian aggressions^ it was suggested In the
note that a time limit of thirty days should be placed on
the arrangements to begin arbitration*

Then# If the ccm^

mission for arbitration had not been appointed# the Council
of the League would be charged with the responsibility of
choosing the arbitrators# arranging the procedure# and de
fining the limits of the commission*
The Council took no action on the suggestions In
the Ethiopian note*

On April 3# Ethiopia again requested

the Council to consider the Item during the special session
that had been called to examine the German announcement of
conscription*

Fearing that the Council might honor this

request# Baron Àloisl# the Italian delegate# informed the
Council that Italy was now ready to agree to arbitration*
The Council took note of this announcement# and decided
that# since an arbitration corantiisslon would at least be
established# there was no need for the Council to consider
the matter during Its special session# but that the matter

Kay, 1935, PP* 57h-?6*

15
Wight be deferred until the next regular session in May#

17

In less than a month the Council received another
notification from the Ethiopian Government that no progress
waa being made#

Thia time there had been no success in

setting up the arbitration commission# because Ethiopia
wanted the ownership of Wal Wal considered^ and because the
Italians objected to the foreign nationals selected by
Ethiopia as her representatives on the commission#

Ethiopia

again appealed to the League under the provisions of Article
15.^®
The Council then decided to make Its own appeal to
the two governments to proceed with the arbitration before
placing tho dispute on the agenda*

Anthony Eden^ the Brit

ish representative to the Council, was sent to talk to both
aides and was able to gain compromises from both govern
ments on the issues that had caused the delay, as well as
an agreement on a time limit for the arbitration#
The Council then passed two resolutions on Kay 2$,
one of which incorporated the agreements that Eden had
been able to work out with the two governments, with a
stipulation that, should the commission be unable to come

p. 550.
June, 1935, pp. 720-21.

16
up with a settlement by July 2>, a fifth arbitrator would
be appointed#

The other resolution stated that^ should no

agreement be reached by August 25# the Council would then
19
meet and examine the situation#
While this was not ccm*
pletely satisfactory to Ethiopia^ since the Council would
not be considering her request until August,, at least the
Council was able to get the Italians to begin arbitration#
However this was not the first occasion on which Italy had
protested her willingness to work for a settlement, only to
delay and obstruct later#

Even if a settlement of the Wal

Wal issue could have been effected now, there was no reason
to believe that the real problem would be solved, for there
would remain the animosity between the two countries, as
well as the Italian plans for invasion#

But the Council^s

decision did mark a certain victory for Ethiopia, for now
it had committed itself in the future, should the commission
be unsuccessful#
The arbitration coimaission began its work on June
25, after having met previously to organise#

By July 9 it

had reached a deadlock and suspended its meetings Indefi»
nitely*

The cause of this interruption was the old ques-»

tlon of the commission^s powers#

Both Governments inter

preted those to be different, Ethiopia Insisting that the

p. 6I|0,

17
ooramiasion could consider the treaties relating to the bound*
aries# and Italy denying it any competence other than the
consideration of the frontier disputes since November*
193i^*

20

Separate reports submitted to the Council by the

Ethiopian arbitrators and the Ethiopian Government indicated
that the deadlock could be broken only with the appointment
of the fifth member#

The Italians would not agree to this

because they said the doadlock was due to Ethiopia*a demand
that the comission exercise more power than it actually
did*
The breakdown Invoked the Council*» decision to con^
eider the matter in such an events and on July 31 it met in
a epeoial session for that purpose*

It was becoming in^

creaslngly evident that Italy was little Interested In
reaching any agreement*

Mussolini had already turned down

a British proposal for a settlement outside of tho League
in which Ethiopia would relinquish Ogadon to the Italians
for territory in British Somaliland,

The Members of the

League began to realise what Haile Selassie had known for
some time* that#Italy needed more time before launching an
attack, and thet all the negotiations had been giving her
the needed time*

The League knew that ft crucial test was

20<poynbee* p# 157♦

18
coming, and tho Council ©oesied ready to take ©oïqo action,
Alolal, however, waa deteriained to delay any Council study,
and reminded the Council that under the provlalons of the
Covenant it could not consider a question as long as it was
still subject to arbitration»

He threatened to boycott the

Council if it wont alicad, which waa enough to persuade the
Council to look again to the commission for its hopes of a
settlement
Italy now agreed to the appointment of the fifth
arbitrator, and the Council Instructed the eoiamiesion to
proceed without considering territorial considerations in
22
the arbitration*
Ihus by agreeing to the inclusion of
the added arbitrator, Italy was able to keep the question
of the ownership of Wal Wal out of consideration*
Ethiopians only consolation from this special ses-*
Sion was another promise by the Council that in the future
it would study the situation*

This time it was to be at

the September I4, moeting, when, regardless of the outcome of
the arbitration, it would take up the examination of the
relations between Italy and ia.tdiopla*^^

August, 1935* P* 966*
^^Ibld** p. 967#
p* 967.

19
After the Council had finished this phase of its
work* Pierre Laval* The French Foreign minister* and Eden
addressed the meeting*

Laval Informed the Council that he

considered it had once more fulfilled its "great and nohlo
mission" which would cause the supporters of the League to
rejoice*

.E© said he realised that only the immediate task

had been accomplished* however* and thifc the serious aitua^
would prompt him in the future to do all in hla power to
utilise conciliation to bring the two together#
Eden then announced that such an attempt would be
xa&de in the very near future*

Italy* France*, and Great

Britain* as^ signatories to the Agreement of 1906 ooncerning Ethiopia* would soon open negotiations with a view "to
facilitating a solution of the differences between Italy
and Ethiopia*"

H©-would report the outcome of these meet-*

Inga to the Council at its next session*

He firmly hoped*

be went on* that by that time their differences would be
settled*
With these developments* the first phase of the
dispute was ended*

The Council thus far had circumvented

the issue* being unwilling to commit itself too deeply#

^ Ibld.. p. 969.
p. 969.

20
Porhapa this was beoauaa It a maiobera were not yet complete*»
ly convinced that the dispute would lead to a war* but
probably higher in their thoughts was the ominous turoat of
an aggressive Germany*

Phis threat to their own safety pre

cluded a wholehearted concern for Ethiopia*

In line with

this reasoning* Italy was considered too valuable an ally
to risk losing because she had already demonstrated her con
cern for security in Ikirope.

France was particularly pro

tective toward her over since Laval had had his talks with
Mussolini in Januax»y of 1935#

Closer cooperation than there

had been for sozne time had been now established between
France and Italy*

Whether or not Italy's African designs

were mentioned at that time it still disputed* but it Is
not inconceivable that Laval did give î*îussolinl some kind
of assurances in light of Laval's later actions.
In any event* Mussolini* through the series of de
lays ho maneuvered* was ablo to gain the time required for
the final preparations for the military invasion of Ethiopia,
By prolonging the direct negotiations to the point of
Ethiopia's exasperation* time was gained* and* when the
Leac^e began to become Involved* he was able to keep the
Council from studying the situation by agreeing to arbitra
tion,

This last step made possible further delays* until

he was able to gain seven months in which to make ready his

21

«Lggreaalon*

H© used diplomacy to his great advantage and

was able to d e n y to Ethiopia the support of the League
during this crucial stage of their relations.

CHAJt'TEa II
m s IKAGÜS a s m s a soiütioiî
When the Counoll adjourned on August 3# 193&# hopes
for a peaceful settlement were high#

Although the Wal Wal

Incident had not been suocesafully arbitrated yet# the ap
pointment of the fifth arbitrator was eao^eoted to break the
deadlock and remove th#t issue from the relations between
Italy and Ethiopia#

A second hopeful sedative was the ex

pectation voiced by M e n that the scheduled negotiations
between Great Britain^ Prance, and Italy would be able to
reconcile the two sides#

The general knowledge that Italy

was after more then she had publicly stated caused concern#
but, if she did not demand too much, perhaps Ethiopia could
be coerced into meeting Italy on the latter*» ground*

Per

haps the British hnd the French would be able to grant to
Ethiopia sufficient compensations to make the entire deal
less offensive to Ethiopian sovereignty#
If a settleinent in line with the principles of the
Covenant was expected# this three-power attempt to settle
the question was really a reversion to methods that had
gone-out of date#

It would have been made outside of the

League of Nations, and because Ethiopia was a member in
22
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good etandingi ah« ahould at least have been allowed to
participate In the discussions#

The fear of another con**

tlnental war# however# concerned all Europeans# particular
ly the French# and the recent occurrences in Germany were
causing considerable concern#

The fear of German militar

ism had a profound Influence on French thinking about the
Covenant^

Since It had been a part of the Treaty of Ver

sailles# France tended to consider It as one of the guaran
tees against German aggression.

Feeling this way# she was

not anxious to see the League become preoccupied in a con
troversy with** ftftly# for any long or unsuccessful involve
ment there might render it ineffective against Germany.
France had a southern frontier and# in the event of
a war with Germany# Italy would be a necessary ally to
France in any dispute with her historic enemy#

Consequent

ly# the spirit of the Covenant was disregarded# and the con
troversy was transferred from the Council to a small group#
with the prospective aggressor# but not the victim# includ
ed*^

As one writer put it# **Halle Selassie was left like

the birds in the air# with no one but God to look after
him#^
Eden had promised to report the outcome of these
negotiations to the Council#

^Walters# p# 638#

In accordance with the second

2k
resolution or,3îuguat 3# 1935# the Council w t

on September

I4. to look into the entire controversy between Italy and
Ethiopia*

The British representative was the flrat to

speak* and* after his introductory remarks, he reported on
the three-power talks th^t h^d transpired in Paris on Au
gust 16*

He said that Italy had refused to list her demands

on Ethiopia, but that, in an attempt to reach some agree2
ment, France and Britain had put forth some proposals*
By their terms, Ethiopia would have been asked to
accept a plan for the complete reorganisation of her in
ternal life.

This would have been done with the help of

foreign advisors, who would have been appointed by the
League of Nations*

Because France, Great Britain, and

Italy held areas contiguous to Ethiopia, these three would
have been particularly veil suited to supervise such a pro
gram#

This general plan of reorganization included such

things as economic, financial, commercial and construction
al development; foreign settlement; modernization of ad
ministrative agencies; anti-slavery measures; and frontier
and other police services#

An attempt was made to give

Italy special consideration in the proposals, for Eden said
thst the collective nature of the assistance to Ethiopia

J»,

Nov. 1935; p. 113)1.
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In reforming her internal life would not preclude taking
Into account the special Interests of Italy*

Furthoz^iore^

while the question was not examined* the proposals did not
In any way exclude the possibility of a territorial adjust»»
ment# although such adjustment would have to be agreeable
to Ethiopia#

Ho specific area was mentioned In the scheme#^

In closing# Eden said that these negotiations had ended In
failure# and then he warned that the Eeague %mst find some
settlement# unless the League *s authority were to be lessened
in future disputes#
Laval followed Eden In addressing the Council and
echoed his colleague^a account of the failure of the Paris
talks*

While he took pooaalon to declare that France rocog-'

nlsed the binding character of the Covenant, he returned to
the same theme of conciliation that he had emphasised at
the Counoll*s meeting on August 3#

From the tone of his

speech# it was obvious that he laid more emphasis upon his
eagerness to play the part of the conciliator# than upon
any concern to exercise his Influence In upholding the
Covenant*

Perhaps this was due to a conviction that a set*

tlement outside of the League could be achieved# but on the
other hand this, desire to side-step the League was probably
prompted by the desire to keep Italy placated# which would

3ibld., p. 113U.
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be much easier te do without having to consider the proeeduree called for in the league of Nations*
At any rate# the lE^ortant thing to Laval then was
to maintain the so-»oalled Stresa Fronts which protested
G e r m a n y r e t u r n to conscription*
be shown every consideration#

To do this# Italy must

In closing# Laval told the

Council that he trusted an equitable settlement would be
reached that would "insure to Italy the satisfaction which
she might legally claim, without failing to recognize the
essential rights of Ethiopian sovereignty#"^!

Ho did not de

fine what he called "essential rights"*
If hopes for a peaceful settlement were dixnmed with
the failure of the faris negotiations just reported on#
there was a greater gloom caused by the Italian reaotioït to
the results of the Wal Val arbitration*

After the fifth

member had been chosen# and the Council had instructed the
arbitrators not to consider territorial questions# an agree^
ment was finally possible*

The commission unanimously re

ported that neither Italy nor Ethiopia could be held re
sponsible for causing the incident# and now, fresh hopes
bloomed.

Might this hot be a basis for a rapprochement be

tween Italy and Ethiopia?

kibld.. p. 1135,
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Italy»s representative# Alolsi# took tha platform
on September Ii# to give tho answer#

He informed the mem-*

bars that the Wal Wal settlement was of no great consequence
to Italy# who had suffered too long from Ethiopian trana-»
gresaion*

To show the world the great outrages Italy had

suffered at the hands of Ethiopia# the Italian Government
had prepared an indictment which would be presented to the
Council#

It would show why Italy had been unable to accept

the proposals put forth at Parla*

It would set forth numer

ous reasons why Italy felt Ethiopia had systematically vio
lated all the conventional undertakings she had assumed
towards Italy and the League of Hâtions#

He promised that

the members of the Council would find irrefutable proof of
the unfriendly attitude adopted by the Ethiopian Government
in the Italian Mémorandum that would sat forth Italy*s
grievances#

He told them that Italy could no longer con->

tlnue to place undeserved confidence in the Ethiopian Gov
ernment# and charged that Italy was forced to consider
Ethiopia a barbarous state# no longer justified in claiming
membership in the League of Hâtions or any rights under the
Friendship Treaty of 1928*^
Ho declared that It had been a mistake ever to

%bld.. pp. 1135-37.
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admit Ethiopia to the League#

She had not fulfilled her

obligations to put an end to slavery# to halt illegal arma
traffic# to curb internal disorder# and to live at peace
with her neighbors*

It was now ii^gpossible for Italy to

consider auch a state an equal any longer# and by interna
tional interpretation of aggression Italy would have had
every right to go to war#

But Itely had not done that and

had shown forbearance instead, only to suffer bloodshed
from an enemy *^whose bad faith had never been controverted#
and that no policy of confidence, no demonstration or treaty
of friendship had succeeded in changing her#”^
Aloisi suggested Italy’s future course when be said
that, in a question such as this that affected the vital
interests and security of the Italian colonies, Italy would
fall her most elementary duty if she did not cease putting
any trust in Ethiopia# and reserve to herself the right of
adopting any measures necessary to safeguard her own inter
ests and the security of her African colonies#^
Those who hoped that the settlement of the Wal Wal
incident would lead to better relations between Italy and
Ethiopia realised they had been hoping in vain*

Alolsi’s

speech introduced the next phase in the dispute# for this

Ibid.A p. 1137.
^Ibld,. p. 1137.
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Avowal of the Italian Government indicated It was shifting
ground and doing all It could to destroy any basis for a
settlement*

Since the ¥al Wal dispute had outlived its

usefulness, Italy was tun d n g to a new method of excusing
her actions*

Ihia attempt to completely discredit Ethiopia

in the eyes of the League and the world# If successful#
might Isolate her from all help in her struggle with Italy,
but# even if it did not accomplish this end# It could still
be useful*

Such an indictment would cause the League to

investigate the charges# thereby giving Italy a little more
time to prepare for the invasion of Ethiopia# before the
Council would take any action on behalf of the intended
victim#
H* Jéze# the Ethiopian representative, indicated
surprise at the indictment#

reminded the Council that

for the past nine months lih© Government of Ethiopia had
constantly affirmed Its desire to achieve a peaceful set*
tlement and establish cordial relations with Italy# and#
notwithstanding the latest Italian charges# the Ethiopian
Government wished to renew that pledge#®

He recalled the

history of the entire dispute# pointing out that Italy# and
not Ethiopia# had been the party always reluctant to see any

^Ibld.. p. 1137.
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Improvement In relations#

Italy had continually held that

Ethiopia had no case, and every time an appeal had been
made to the League the Italians had always found exouses
for delay#

Italy was just stallirg for tlme^ and the

charges sat forth In the memorandum were only a new pre
text to excuse unilateral action by Italy#

He

regretted

that time had not allowed Ethiopia to reply to the Italian
charges# but# until this could bo done# he pleaded with the
Council to remember that time did not allow for dilatory
measures#

The Council*s paramount duty was to prevent a

war of extermination that could com© any day#

This should

take precedence over any Investigation of the charges In
the mcmorandxnn#^
Perhaps the best answer to the Italian charges was
given by Maxim Litvinoff, the Russian delegate#

Rising In

defense of Ethiopia^ he challenged the Italian request for
the Council to declare its disinterestedness and to grant
the Italian demand for freedom of action#

He charged the

Italians with inviting the members of the Council to re
pudiate their international obligations and the Covenant*
Italy still threatened Ethiopia even though the Wal Wal
settlement eliminated any concrete dispute, and therefore

9ibid., p, nij.2.
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the meuibers could not forget the principles of the Covenant
and IghOre the exletenoe of th-% threat#

That would be a

violation in itself of the Covenant^ and a further weaken-*
Ing of the League of Nations#

Another failure would stimu-*

late conflicts directly affecting Europe# and to fail Ethl-*
opia would be inviting dlsaater#^^

Itely’s ’•civilising

action” would not be a Justification for war and# unless
the Council did all in its power to avert an armed conflict
between two members of the L e a ^ e # It would not be accom-*
push i n g the raison d^ et*re of the League itaelf*^^
There was no tone of appeasement or conciliation in
Litvlnoff^s speech# and to follow such advlpe must have
been a frightening prospect to those who felt that the dia-*
pute would best be settled by some agency other than the
Council*

Litvlnoff# however# stood alone in speaking for

Ethiopia at that meeting of the Council because the other
representatives were not ready to commit their governments
to any action unwelcome to Italy#
The memorandum submitted by the Italian Government
was a lengthy «tt03xç>t thoroughly to discredit Ethiopia in
the eyes of her fellow nations# complete with pictures#
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tefitimouîest and eye vltneee aocounte#
grievance® In groat detail*.

It set forth Italy*s

In the first place it charged

Ethiopia with failing to carry out treaty agreements with
Italy and her obligations to the Covenant| it listed inci
dents considered by Italy to have been outrages against
Italian diplomats# consuls# Italian subjects# and colonies;
it presented orgujsents that Italy must consider Ethiopia in
capable of continuing as a member of the League; it charged
Ethiopia with continuing to practice slavery; it accused the
Ethiopian Government of allowing illegal arms traffic; and
it pointed Out examples of Ethiopia's failure to perform
the duties of League membership#

hp^aking in Italy's de

fense# the memorandum stated that for Italy to put an end
to such Intolerable circumstances would not be a violation
of the Covenant# but# on the contrary, Italy would be defending the prestige and good hame of the League of Katlons*
Ethiopia's answer to these charges was submitted to
the League on September ll| In the form of coimenta by K#
Marcel Griale# an individual whom thé Italian Government
had referred to in the memorandum as being a scientific
authority on conditions in Ethiopia*

He questioned the

memorandum's authenticity on various grounds and concluded

IZibld., Ho t . , 1935. PP. 1355-86.
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that many of tha charges were \infounded*^^
However, despite tha fact that It was shown sub se-*
quently that tha memorandum* s accusations wore inaccurate
in a number of respects, the public was greatly influenced
at the time*

According to Walters, It provided an excel*-

lent excuse for the pro-Italian factions, who were urging
that the quarrel was a matter that should be settled solely
between the two countries, to come to Italy's defens
The charges in the memorendum had the further effect of plac
ing Ethiopia in an embarrassing position*

It was common

knowledge that social evils still existed within the Empire,
but no credit had been j^iven to the. efforts that Haile
Selassie had been making to correct them*

Ethiopia was now

the accused, and. In the time interval required for Ethiopia
to draft the reply submitted on September II4, the Italians
reaped benefits*

Hot only was Ethiopians integrity tempo

rarily in question, but also the Oouncil decided to attempt
to find a solution through conciliation, a process that
gave Italy more time*
In spite of placing Ethiopia on tho defensive with
in the League of Nations by discrediting her, the Italian

13ibld.. pp. 1S8?3-9!u
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Goverraaent could ctlll not justifiably declare war#

Italy

wanted Ethiopia to be expelled from the League^ a fact that
Is evidenced by the speech made by Aloisi as well as by the
memorandum#

One® denied membership^ Italy hoped Ethiopians

defenders would be few#

The Italian Government apparently

thought that League sentiment would be less damiing In an'
aggression against a non-member# but even in such a case
Italy would be violating tne Covonant# because of the pro
visions of Article 17»^^

Ethiopia would certainly have

claimed for herself the rights granted in this article to
a non-member#

In such a ease^ she would enjoy technical

membership during the course of the dispute# and the artl-*
cles dealing with acts of aggression would be as binding on
Italy as if Ethiopia were still a member in good standing#
Litvinoff*s remarks were a reminder to the members of this
condition#

16

At tha second meeting of the Council on September 5#
Jeae made a fresh appeal to the Council to take action#
again under the provisions of Article 1$ of the Covenant#

^ I n any dispute between a member and a non-member#
or between non-mombers# those states were Invited to accept
the obligations of membership# and in that event# the proviolons of Articles 12 to 16 were to extend to such states#
^^Supra, p. 31.
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b y which tha League was to endeavour to effect settlements
of dispute3

The means to Implement the provisions of

Article 15 caused considerable controversy in the Council#
with Aloisi and Jeze engaging in bitter arguments*

The

decision was m^de on the same day to appoint a committee
composed of five of the Council*e members to attempt to work
out an agreement# but not until the strong Italian protest
had been overcome by personal negotiations on the sixth did
the c(%mlttee actually come into existence*

At the regular

meeting of the Council on September 6 the Committee of Five
was charged with undertaking the general examination of the
18
conflict and attempting to find a basis for agreement#*
Aloisi abstained from voting#
The OcKianittee of Five was composed of the United
Kingdom# France# Poland# Spain# and Turkey#

It had its

first meeting on September 7# 1935# but# before relating
Its activities from then until September 21;.# attention must
be turned to the Assembly of the League of Katlons# which
was to open its debate on the ninth#.
The world realised that the Council*a decision to
investigate the dispute through the Committee of Five would

Hov., 1935, P. 11^2,
p.
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launch tha League's attempt to bring Itfîly and Ethiopia to-*
gether*

But there waa etill uncertainty over what the

League of Nations would do In the event Italy Invaded
Ethiopia# and all expected the Assembly debates to answer
this question»

Would Italy be told that an act of aggres

sion would be met by sanctions imposed by the League or
would hesitancy and indecision prompt Italy to go ahead?
Actual debate began on September 11# with Sir Samuel
Hoare# the British Foreign Secretary# making the first
speech»^^

Initially# Hoare spoke of che deep attachment

the people of Great Britain had to the League of Nations#
and stated that all were Interested in a settlement.
Then he spoke out for the principles of the Covenant
and assured the Assembly that Great Britain would support
the League in whatever action it might take*

His Govern

ment felt that the League and its ideals were the most ef
fective means of maintaining the peace# and for thmt reason
the League must be preserved*
Ho let it be known# however# that British support
of the League would not be unqualified*

To dispel any

doubts# he Insisted that Great Britain would not bear the

^^League of Nations# Assembl"^ Official Journal#
Special Supplement 138> (Geneva: 1933), pp. '
Cited hereafter as
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reaponalbiXitlea and rlaka alone * and that in suoh a eol^
lective effort to maintain the peace the burden must also
be borne collectively.

Should the members cooperate In en

forcing the Covenant* Great Britain's support would be as
sured#
Hoare's words did much to dispel fears throughout
Europe that the League might not successfully meet the
Italian threat^ thereby destroying its own effectiveness.
It was recognised that the League could never be effective
without Great Britain's support* and now this avowal indi
cated that the League could count on Great Britain,

At

last one of the big powers had openly committed Itself to
the League* and courage came to other governments to take
the same resolve#
The groat remaining doubt was over the speculation
of what the French policy would be* and Laval was one of
the last to speak.

His first remarks were encouraging to

all who desired to see the League stand firm.

He indicated

that France was loyal to the Covenant and would not fail
her obligations in this instance*

He pictured the League

of Nations as a creation of all who desired peace* and said
the Covenant was the ^International law™ of France#

pp. 65-66.

Franca would
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never allow the Covenant to be weakened* so Prance, like
Great Britain* aeemed ready to give the League her wholes*
hearted support#
But beyond thla facade Intended for public oonsump**
tlon* Laval then went on to discuss Pranco-Italian rela-*
tionshlps#

He reminded the Assembly that on January 7, 1935#

he and Mussolini had conducted talks during which the two
countries had **roach0d a final settlement of all#♦♦differ
ences’**

Because Italy*s friendship was valued bo highly,

he had left nothing undone to maintain this friendship#
For that reason, he said, he had spared no efforts at con
ciliation and in the present activities of the Council he
would once more have the satisfaction of fulfilling the
same duty#
As it later turned out, the significant passagos In
Laval*s speech were not those reaffirming French intentions
to carry out the Covenant, but rather those touching on the
relationships with Italy#

For the third time, Laval pub

licly pronounced in effect that Prance would support the
League of Nations only after all hopso for a settlement
through conciliation were gone, and, to the very end, Laval
refused to acknowledge that such a method of settlement
would not succeed#

With the warm references to Italy, his

must have been a very reluctant promise that France would

39
stand on the aide of the L e a ^ o of nations*
Other roprssentatlvas continued to speak on behalf
of the Covenant*

Some of the speeches were almost pro

phétie, although perhaps Judging them now in light of what
happened makes them seem so»

The speech made by the dele«

gate from Portugal, Senhor Konteiro, deserves comment
Ha expressed the opinion that collective security was of
little value if it did not protect the independence of all
nations against conquest or against decisions not freely
accepted#

He said,

must say that there is one thing

that I loathe even more than war, and that is spoliation
by procedure•'*

Oartainly Ethiopia*s fate was determined

in 1936 with spoliation by the procedures of conciliation I
There had already been evidence of spoliation of a sort in
the advantage Italy had maintained in the world organisa
tion, where she had been able to delay formal Council con
sideration of the dispute, but the greatest spoliation had
not yet occurred*
Lltvinoff also spoke to the Assembly during this
phase of its debate, giving Russian support to any actions
that the League might take against Italy»^^

Zlibld,. p. 71.
pp. 71-73.

His tone

ko
lndicA.ted« however» that he wae not coxrqpletely convinced
that» when the ehowdown came# the same epirlt shown in
these meetings would still prevail»

^e said that# if the

various govermeflofca «would fulfill the pledges Just given to
allow no Illegal aggression regaMless of the origin or the
object# the Assembly then would become a landmark in the
League»s history*
With the key words# **if** and "they*^# emphasised#
did Litvinoff already know that Great Britain and France
had agreed on September 10 that# should sanctions be neo-*
essary# their use would be limited to non-military sanc
tions y

In anyvpvent# this was the case# as Laval later re

ported to the Chamber of Deputies#

On that date# he and

Eoare discussed the entire situation and agreed that their
respective governments would not support military sanctions#
any naval blockade# closure of the Sues Canal# or any other
measure that might lead the^ into a war with Italy#^^
Had the Assembly known of this secret agreement#
the new-found faith that the League of Hat ions would stand
against Italy would have been shattered and certainly lit
tle i%%>ortance would have been attributed to the public
statements of Hoare and Laval in the Assembly#

23Toynbee# pp# 183-Gk#

It was from

hi
H
this time In September untllvthe entire issue wae .settled
with the Italian victory that the muddled policy of states
In Sind out of the League became so evident#

It was an un^

realistic policy because Its success depended on neither
the League’s nor Italy’s suffering a defeat^ an impossible
situation which could end only as it did#
The Italian reply to the debates in the Aasenibly
was made In an official communique issued after the Italian
Cabinet meeting on September 11|#^^

Tlie Cabinet raeêlved

the speeches with the greatest calm# since it felt that the
French and British positions could not have been different
from what they were#

Italy was pleased with the cordial

words Laval had for the Franco-Italian agreements of 1935#
and the friendship between the two countries#

The commun!

que wont on to say that Italy intended to develop that
friendship in the interest of the two countries and European
collaboration#

This friendship would not be broken by a

colonial conflict or by the use of sanctions#
But the threat of sanctions caused the Cabinet some
concern# or otherwise there would not have

been a warning

to the blague of Kations thmt their application would render

^^The Times# September 16# 1935# Cited in Stephen
ne&ld(ed#)# Documents on International Affairs# 1935# Vol,
XI# Royal Institute of~Tnternational Affairs# (London;
Oxford University Press# 1937)# pp# 105-106#
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continued Italian jwernberahlp In the ^eague Impossible#

As

far as the Italian Cabinet was concerned# the ItalO'-Sthlopian
dispute could never be settled by coitq)remise# and# in view
of tha efforts and sacrifices already made by Italy and the
"Irrefutable documentation" In the Italian memorandum# only
one solution was possible»^^
Had the Italians known of the September 10 agree^»
mont between Laval and Hoare# they would have been less
concerned# but they were preparing for any eventualities#
Killt&ry preparation In Last Africa was procoeding with
greater intensity and war material production was being in
creased with all possible speed#

It was obvious that the

Italian Government had decided not to back down no matter
what course the Council might take#
The Committee of Five had been meeting since Sep
tember 7 in what later proved to be another unsuccessful
attempt to reconcile the disputants*

Eleven days after its

first session it had worked out a plan for a settlement
which was submitted to Italy and E t h i o p i a # I n its re
port# the Committee stated that It had been guided by an
obligation to respect Ethiopian sovereignty and at the same

^^Ibld.. p* 106.
complete text of report and plan see L.K.O.J..
Hov,, 1935» PP* 1621-214.
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time maintain good relations between members of the Leagueé
Also» it decided to ezpreso no'opinions on the documents
that the two governments had submitted» and to confine it^
self to the situation which demanded a remedy»

The report

recalled the conditions upon which Ethiopia was admitted to
the League and the obligations she had assumed regarding
slavery and arms traffic#

At that time» Ethiopia had prom

ised to consider any recommendations that might be made to
her by the League concerning these practices#
As recently as September 11» the report continued»
the first delegate from Ethiopia told the Assembly that his
government would view with gratitude any suggestions pro
ceeding from the League that wore calculated to raise the
social» economic» and political level of Ethiopia#

In view

of this and to enable her to live at peace with her neigh^
borSf the Committee of Five had devised a plan that it
hoped would be in line with the duties of the League#

How

ever this proposed plan of assistance would have to be ac
ceptable to the Ethiopian Government#
Under this plan there were provisions for the re
organisation of internal affairs in Ethiopia#

Foreign

specialists were to organise police services which would be
responsible for controlling slavery and arms traffic» po
licing areas with a predominantly foreign population, in
suring security in areas where local police facilities were

Inadequate, and maintaining order in frontier areas*

Eoo-

nomlo reorganisation called for foreign participation In
the economic development of Ethiopia, placing foreign trade
on a basis of reciprocity and allowing foreign assistance
in establishing more adequate communication facilities.
Financial reorganisation provided for assistance in draw^
Ing up the budget and supervising expenditures, assessing
and collecting revenues, establishing and operating fiscal
monopolies, and studying possibilities for loans for in-*
ternal development.

Judicial reorganization made provl^

along for establishing mixed courts for foreign use and
native courts for domestic use.
To carry out this plan, each of the services nen^
tloned would be headed b y an individual or a commission re
sponsible to the League of Nations,

These would be joint

ly appointed b y the Council and the Emperor, with the re
maining staffs to be appointed b y the Emperor upon nomina
tion b y the Counoll#

The chief advisor or commission of

each of the;services would report once a year to both the
League and the Emperor, and the latter would be authorized
to submit reports as he saw fit*

No time limit for the

duration of the plan was mentioned, but, if continued in
use, the Oouncil would review its effectiveness at five
year Intervals*

Acoorapanying the plana for reorganization was an
offer of territorial adjuatmente*

Prance and Great Britain

proposed to grant Ethiopia concessions from their respective
holdings along the Somaliland coast. In return for Ethiopian
concession of the areas of Ogaden and Danakil to Italy.
Furthermore, the two governments Informed the Committee of
Five that they would not object to recognizing special
economic interests of Italy In Ethiopia, as long as existing
rights and treaty agreements were not violated#
This attempted settlement was unlike the one pro
posed at the Paris negotiations in that Ethiopian adminis^
trativo agencies would be under League, rather than threepower, supervision, but it was reminiscent of the former
proposals as far as territorial exchanges were concerned#
This time the area of Danakil had been added to the pay
ment that France and Great Britain were ready to make to
buy .off Italy»

Eovever the plan did not make Ethiopia a

virtual protectorate of Italy, and that was the only set
tlement Mussolini would accept.
Because Ethiopian sovereignty was left pretty much
intact, Haile Selassie was prepared to accept the Coimitt e e ’s p l an as a basis for further negotiations#

Ko advan

tage was ever taken of this concession#
On September 18, Mussolini told a representative of

kh
the Dall;y Me 11 that the n w

proposals were not only unac

ceptable, but also d e r i s o r y ; ^7
The suggestion Is apparently made th&t Italy^s
need for expansion in East. Africa should b® met b y
the cession to her of a couple of deserts - one salt,
the other of stone,#.*It looks as If the Committee
of the League thinks I am
collector of deserts*
I got 110,000 square mile» of Saharan desert from
the French a little while ago*
Do you know how
many Inhabitants there are in the Whole desolate
area? Sixty-two*
The official Italian reply was received by the
League on September 21*

It was a rejection of the plan.

The corwaunique stated that the Cabinet had examined vhe
proposals, and appreciated the efforts, but considered them
unacceptable*

The Cabinet felt that not enough considera

tion had been given to the Italian rights and interests in
the entire matter*^®
On the 22nd, Aloicl commented more explicitly on
the Italian rejection at a meetlnj^ of the Council.

H©

justified his government♦a rejection bn the grounds that

41) the Committee had not given full consideration to the
charges in the Italian memorandum;

42) Ismcdiato action was

required to alleviate the condition of the exploited natives

in Ethiopia; (3) the proposals did not go for enough to

^^Toynbea, p* 19$.
23
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protect Ethiopians neighbors; (U) in a country where bar-#
barlsm was accompanied by powerful armament# both the League
and Italy must take action; (5) the Covenant was not the
means through which a solution could be reached because
Ethiopia no longer deserved to demand rights under it;
(6) the plan# as conceived by the Committee# did not allow
for any control of the Ethiopian array; (7) the suggested
territorial changes would allow Ethiopia access to the sea,
further magnifying her threat to Italy, and (8) Italy could
not put faith in any agreements to be made with Ethiopia,
a state which did,not honor her treaty obligations,^^
With this Italian rejection of the Committee of
Five’s efforts, the plan never became more than an academic
consideration#

Since the plan had actually answered the

Italian grievances to a great extent, Italy’s rejection
further indicated that nothing but the complete control of
Ethiopia would satisfy her ambitions*
Haile Selassie realized that this position was be-*
coming more desperate, and, in another attempt to get fur
ther League support, ho announced the creation of a thirty
kilometer wide neutral zone along the Italian colonial fron
tiers#

He asked that the League immediately dispatch

29L.IT.O.J*# Hov#, 1935, pp# 1625-26#
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observers to this area to ascertain that Ethiopia was not
in any aggressive actions#^^

Events, however,

were moving so rapidly that this proposal was never uti
lised#
The Oommittee of Five reported to the Council ex
pressing its failure to come up with an acceptable solution
on September 21^, and two days later the Council met to act
on
under paragraph k, of
l3*
dinco the Committee of
Five had been unsuccessful, the Council was obligated to
publish a report containing Its recommendations*

For this

purpose, the Council resolved Itself into the Committee of
Thirteen and began its work#
During the interval between September 26 and Octo
ber 5 $ when the Committee of Thirteen was at work, poten
tialities beoaiae realities*

Ethiopia declared general mo

bilisation on September 28, and the Italian i w a a i o n of
Ethiopia was launched on October 3#

The Secretary-General

of the League of Hawions was informed by the Government of
'ip
Ethiopia of the impending hostilities on the s e c o n d , a n d ,
in a later telegram the next

, the Italian Government

30lbld,. p. 1189.
31por full text see Appendix, p. 123

Bov., 1935. p. 1603.
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informed the Secretary-General that its military forces had
been forced to act in the defense of the Italian colonies*-33
The Italian telegram stated that the Ethiopian mo
bilisation and the creation of the neutral zone* which had
been nothing more than a strategic move to prepare an at
tack against It%ly* had forced the Italian High Command in
Eritrea to act In defense#
begun#

With these events the war had

Now the League of Nations was faced with the addi

tional problem of open warfare#
The Councilf as the Committee of Thirteen# rendered
its report on October 5#^^

It recounted the entire history

of the dispute# particularly as It had effected the League
of Nations#

It retold the story of Wal W&l and the attempts

at arbitration; it discussed Ethiopia*s conduct since 1923#
and rejected the Italian case in the memorandum in Its es
sential points#

It mentioned the Italian refusal to coop

erate# and the failure of the Committee of Five#

Walters

described it as *the judgment of thirteen states thit
reached conclusions completely unfavorable to the Italian
case#*3^ even though moat of the thirteen were anxious not

33ibld.. p. 1603.
3Uibld.. pp, 1605-19»
^^alte?a, p, 653.

so

to alienate Italian sentiment#
In that light of the open warfare^ the Council rec-*
owmended that for the time being the viol(?tion of the Cove
nant should be brought to an end, and reserved the right to
make subsequent recommond&tions as to how this would be done*
Italy offered no new line of resistance to the Coun
cil's decision*

She followed the same line that she had

since the middle of September by contending that the Coun
cil had not given consideration to the injustices Italy had
suffered at the hands of Ethiopia,

In neglecting Italy^s

case, the Council had allowed Ethiopia to come before it as
a victim, and ^artificial alarmist agitation** had led to
the absurd result th^t the j&thlopian menace to Italy was
transformed Into an Italiah menace to Ethiopia*

Italian

operations had been quite legitimate in view of the mobi
lisation order.

As long as Ethiopia aggressive attitudes

wore allowed to continue, there could never be a just solu
tion of the dispute
The Ethiopian delegate accepted the Council*s re
port, and appealed to It to take action against Italy under
the provisions of Article 16 of the C o v e n a n t . H e

HOT., 1932, p. 1212.
37Artlcle 16 was the moat important Article In the
entire scheme of collective security as was envisioned in
the Covenant* When a state was declared an aggressor all
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contended that.Italy had resorted to war In violation of
her obligations to the League of Hat Ions ^ thereby bring-*
Ing into force Article 16*

He requested the Council to de

clare that Italy had resorted to war within the meaning of
the CovenantI that her resort to war had^ l^ao facto,
brought about the consequences of the first paragraph of
the Article*

H@ asked the Council to fulfill its obliga

tions evolving out of Article 16 by bringing the hoat111ties to a close as soon as possible*
The Council appointed from its members a Committee
of Six to study the latest events and to advise the Coun
cil of all the matters Involved*

This committee had to

determine two fundamental questions; did a state of war
exist* and* if so* was it in disregard of thé Covenant?
To determine the answers it considered the events occurring
since October 2* and with great speed It reported on Octo
ber 7*^^
The report called attention to the fact that a

members of the League were to cease intercourse with that
state and its nationals* The Council ootald recommend that
military action could be taken against the Covenant break
ing state* For full text, see A p p e n d i x , p. 12ii.
hÆildj.»

1935# p. 1?13.

^^Ibld.f pp, 1223-2$, Members were Groat Britain,
Chile* Denmark* France* Portugal* and Rumania*
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nation did not have the authority to go to war without first
having complied with the provisions of Articles 12, 13# and
l^^UO

these Articles It was the duty of all members

of the League of Katlons to submit disputes to arbitration#
judicial settlement# or Council inquiry# and under Article
12, the members could not resort to war within three months
after one of the above provisions had been met*
cable date in this case was September l|# 1935#

The appli
The adop

tion of war by Italy as a means of ending her dispute with
Ethiopia was therefore in violation of the Covenantg

Italy*(

charge that she had had to act in self defense was not ten
able# because the adoption of internal measures of security
by one state did not authorise another state to violate the
Covenant#

After having examined all the facts of the case#

it was the opinion of the Committee of Six that the Italian
Government had **resorted to war in disregard of its cove
nants under Article 12 of tho Covenant of Ihe League of
Nations#*’
In the vote in tho Council for the adoption of the
committee^ a report, only Italy voted against# but because
she was a party to the dispute, the report’s unanimous ac
ceptance was not affected#

pp#

The Council then referred the

^^For full text of these Articles# ace
122-23.
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report of the Committee of Six to the Asseiably^ which wag
to be in aeesion on October 9# two days after the report
was accepted by the Council*

During this interval of time#

the President of the Council urged the members to do all
they could to acquaint the delegates in the Assembly with
the great task that the League was undertaking»
Once again interest turned to the Assembly, where
the recommendations of the Council would be accepted or re
jected#

As the session opened, Edward Bonos, the Presi

dent of the Assembly, urged all the members to male© known
their feelings#

The Covenant had left it up to each indi

vidual member to determine whether or not Article 16 would
become binding, and the general support of all nations was
needed if the League were to be successful#

&uoh debate

would go a long way ih aligning public opinion and assur
ing each inember thftt it would be sharing in the burden of
applying Banctions#
In the three days of debate, fifty of the member
nations expressed cheir intention of applying the provisions
of Article 16#

Three nations--Au3tria, Hungary, and Alba

nia— indicated that they would be unable to enforce sanc
tions because of friendship and economic ties with Italy,
and Switzerland deblared her neutrality#
These dissensions did not greatly detract from the

5h
Bioral effect of the verdict, but, due to the unanimity rule
In the League of Nations, these nations could have stopped
the application of sanctions had their use been put forth
In the form of p resolution,

ïo circumvent this possible

obstaclet Bones pointed out that the matter of sanctions
was for individual members to decide.

But to facilitate

the implementation of sanctions against Italy by those who
desired to do so, the members were invited to set up a co^
ordinatlng committee thr't would function to aid their ef
forts.
Thus, by October 11, 1935 the morabora of tho League
had made the décision to use the League of Nations for the
purpose for which it wss intended*

It had finally taken

to heart the urgent ple^diiigü from one of its members,
Kthlopia,

At last Article 15 of the Covenant had been in

voked, but only after a long costly delay, bec’iuse Italy
was able to execute the invasion before any settlement was
reached.
The military Invasion greatly complicated the
League*» task, for favorable Italian prospects for conquest
made Mussolini less interested in coiiclliatlon.

The members

were forced now to take the extreme steps of applying sanc
tions against Italy In honoring their obligations arising
from Article 16,
Initial stpge.

The great experiment was now in its
The world*s attention was turned to the
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activities in the Co-ordinating Committee, where the experInent was being defined and sot up*
While some were doubtful of success, others Insist-»
od that there could be no other result if the League was to
survive# and, to achieve that end, the cooperation of all
meiabera would be necessary.

But the speeches of September

in the Assembly had seemed to assure this, <nd the decision
to set up the machinery to enforce the necessary measures
against Italy was made with no serious misgivings,
sionment was yet to come#

Dlsillu-

C!îAPTEH III
C0!ZFID2VCE Al^D SAKCTJ0N3
The création of the Coiœaittee of Go-ordlDatlon as
the body to deal with tho application of sanctions agslnat
Italy was a tacit acknowledgment that the constitutional
limitations in the Covenant precluded using the existing
organs of the League to deal with Italy#

Because of the

unanimity rule in both the Assembly and the Council» action
could easily have been blocked.

But by viewing the entire

sanctions issue as being a problem for the members to deal
with collectively, and not as actions of the League per se#
any powers wishing to uphold Article 16 could act regard**
less of Italy.
Bridging the constitutional question, nevertheless,
left the moat important issue unanswered.

Would the members

of the League of Katlons be united enough in purpose and
exorcise the necessary moral courage to deal with one of
the larger powers in the organisation?

Although their past

record had been unimpressive, this time there seemed to be
strong sentiment for successful united action.

Hoare and

Laval had given the support of their governments to the
undertaking, and the tone of the speeches in the Assembly
56
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In September had shown other governments to be equally
anxious for tho League to honor the principles of the Cove
nant*

This had done a good deal to create a feeling of

confidence as the task of applying
In reality, th

sanctions was be.;^un*

League

w&a attempting

things at once during the next

few months8 to

deal withone

of the large powers and to try

out tho weapon

of

sanctions.

to

do two

économie

The latter was the first attempt at collective

action of a non-military nature égslnst one of its members
branded as an aggressor*

It was uncoiamcn for nations to

adopt measures that might impair their own economic well
being in defense of another political entity that was in
significant in world politics*

Litvinoff*s warning was

finally being heeded,^ and the fear that unchecked aggres
sion in Africa would encourage it in Kurope was enough to
force the League to go to Ethiopia* s side*
The consequences of this fear manifested themselves
in strange ways*

France was now placed In a dileinna*

Dhe

found herself faced with tho necessity of reconciling her
allegienoe to the Covenant with her desire to keeo Italy
In her cf«mp*

To whet extent could she cooperate in sanc

tions before alienating Italy* and to what degree could she

^dupra* p* 31.
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let the League fail this tiïüef

She might want to use it

in Europe under si&iil&r circuiastsnoeSji and b serious de
feat now would make It useless later*
The answer was sefn in the emasculated sar..cttcns
that were finally decide upon*

^.rticle 16 called for the

severance of trade and financiJ^l relations, prohibition of
Intercourse with the nationals of the Covenant-breaking
state, the possible us® of arma against the aggressor, and
tho further possibility of his being expelled from the
League*

The sanctions that were put into effect, in con

trast, were more annoying then they were hax'mful to Italy,
for she was still able to execute the war successfully.
The double objectives of keeping Italy placated and
at thef same time enforcing Article 16 could not both be
fulfilled.

The eventual del%at of Ethiopia was fores' ad-

owed in 1935 by the politiosil machinations thut overpowered
the will to carry out the Covenant.

Political hypocrisy

contributed to her defeat equally as much as military re
versals.
To understand more easily the procedure followed by
the Co-ordination Committee, the resolutions passed by the
Assembly in 1921 should be considered.

2

The Covenant had
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envisaged

a universal organisation, but with tho abaonce

of such powers as the United States, Russia, and Gennany,
members became alars'aod over the conséquences of a strict
interpretation of Article 16,

How could they, as members

of the League, apply any effecwiv© sanctions whon an ag
gressor could easily turn to the markets of these non-^memborat

The resolutions of 1921 were Intended to supplement

the Covenant when the League was noting under Article 16,
The Council was to be given a supervisory role for the en
tire procedures necessary to impose the a emotions called
for in the entire article, not just those of a military
nature.

It could be assisted by a tochnical coD&iittee in

the task of co-ordinating tho efforts of the entire member*
ship,
A second significant idea embodied in the resolu
tions of 1921 was that of tho graduated economic and fin
ancial sanctions.

Resolution ll| state 2 that, if the appli

cation of ©conomle pressure were prolonged, meaiflures of in
creasing stringency might be telcen.

The most severe was

the cutting off of the food supply of the civilian popu
lation, a measure of last resort to be taken only when all
other measures had failed.

This implied that the enforce

ment of sanctions was to be a graduated process, rather
than an abrupt and definite severance of all relations*
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Even though these resolutions were never ratified
by the members# their Influence can be seen in the type of
sanctions that were applied against Italy*

The character

of the sanctions and their application were not the same as
was called for %n Article 16 which stipulated the immediate
severance of all trade and financial relations#
The resolution of the Assembly inviting members of
the League to constitute a co-ordination committee, which
was the first step t«ken to Implement sanctions, readsi
The Assembly
Having tiikeu cogniaanoo of the opinions ©zprcsaod by
the members of the Council »t the Council*» meeting on
October 7# 1935;
Taking Into eonsiderstion the obligation» which rest
upon the Members of the League in virtue of Article 16
of the Covenant and the desirability of co-ordination of
the measures which they may severally contemplate;
Recommends that the Members of the League, other thah
the parties, should set up a committee, composed of one
delegate, assisted by exports, for each Member, to con
sider and facilitate the co-ordination of such measure»
and, if necessary, draw the attention of the Council or
the Assembly to the situations requiring to be examined
by them.
Just what was the nature of the committee thet had
been set up?

The President of the Aasembly, Benes> said that

It was neither an Assembly nor a Couhcll organ, but a **con
ference of States Members meeting to consult together with
a view to the application of Article 16, ^*3
numerous objections to Its existence.

13d, pp. 113-115-.

Alolsi raised

If it was not an
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organ of the League« he contended that the governiaenta were
taking independent action through it, which waa not only a
violation of the Covenant# but also contributed to an at*
moaphere of unrest which was a denger to European peace#^
In spite of the Italian objections to the operation
of the Co-'Ordinating Committee# the Assembly never did at
tempt to define Its legal status#

In the absence of such

a definitive decision, one m?ghfe say that it possessed the
status of an organ of the League of Nations as it was set
up by the members of the Lesgue of Nations in order to
carry out their obligations under the C o v e n a n t #5
The power Of this committee, or conference as it
might be called, was fixed by the Assembly resolution of
October 10*

According to it the Co-ordination Committee

waa to ^consider and facilitate" the co-ordination of meas
ures under Article 16 and, where necessary, "to draw the
attention of the Council or the Assembly to situations re
quiring to be exajmincd by them*"

‘These terms were amply

broad to permit diverse technical studies being made*

The

only question which might arise under them waa that of the

^L.K.O.J.S.S. ISO, pp. 336-37.
^Albert Urn Highlay, The A citons of the States Members of the Lear?ie of Nacions in /Application of Sanctions
Against It^ly, 19357i93ô* Doctoral Dissertation, University
of Creneva^COeneva : Journal de Cronevn, 1938), p* 91#
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nature of the action taken by It.

In thla respect It was

made clear on numerous oocasiona that only recommendatlona
were possible.

Ko blading decisions could be talien.^

To make its task easier# the committee used a sys*
tern of subcommittees throughout the entire sanctions issue.
The Co-ordination Committee remained the final judge on anyproposed actions# but it delegated the main responsibility
for determining action to the Committee of Eighteen#

In

stead of having to operate within a committee of fifty four
members# the primary decisions were made In thla smaller
body#
The Committee of Eighteen in turn appointed various
other subcommittees to aid it in Its work#

These subcom

mittees wore of two typesî the one was concerned with the
preparation of proposal# and the other dealt with complex
technical problems.
first type#

There wore five subcommittees of the

These were (1) a drafting committee for Pro

posal I# (2) a Military Suboommittoe# (3) a Financial Sub
committee# (i|.) an Economic Subcoxmrdttee# and (5) a Mutual
Support Subcommittee#

These were responsible for the five

proposal# that were eventually passed by the Co-ordination

Cf.# E.H»0,y.S .S # llih*. p. 33# M* de Madariaga#
Spain# and I, k T q #
lli67 p. 53# M, Stuck!# Switzerland.
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Committee#

The auheomrnltteea of the second type were also

five in number#

These wore the (1) Economic Committee>

(2) the IfCgal Committee# (3) the Clearing Agreements Coromitteej (l|,) the Contracts Committee and (S) the Petroleum
Experts Comittee#

The nature of the work of these oommlt-»

toes is indicated bj their titles*^

Membership on any of

these committees was doterolned by the particular interests
of the various members end geographical location#^
With these general considerations in mind, the work
of the Co-ordination Committee can be examined#

At Its

first meeting on October 11, Auguste de Vasconcellos of
Portugal was elected Chairman#

The Gooaaittee of Eighteen

was established to carry out the main work, leaving the
Co'^ordinatlon Committee to pass on the final recommend a-*
tions#
At the first meeting of the Committee of Eighteen
on the same day, the first steps were taken*

% e members

decided that an arms embargo was the most urgent require^
ment, and Eden, the British representative, and Coulondre,
the French representative, drew up Proposal

based on

Taighley, pp#
p. 95,
^Pop I'ull text, seo Api^endlx, pp. 128-29.

the îteias Included In the United States embargo already In
force*

Proposal I called for the limedlate lifting of the

existing embargoes on arms shipments to Ethiopia that Indl-**
vidual countries might have passed, and an imposition of an
embargo on such shipments to Italy*

These measures were to

apply to any contracts in the process of execution*

The

members were further requested to prevent any such ship-»
ment8 that might reach Italy Indirectly*
At the aecond meeting of the Co-^ordir^atlon Commit-»
tee on the eleventh# Proposal I was put to vote*

Hungary

abstained, and Switzerland and Luxembourg refused to vio
late their neutrality by allowing arms shipments to Ethiopia*
The rapidity with Which this proposal was passed
is interesting*

All this had been done in the first day,

and it is worthy of emphasis In view of the fact that the
practice in the case of later proposals was less ideal*

On

the other hand# it Is to be noted that this first measure
did not have unanimity# in view of the decisions of Hungary#
Switzerland, and Luxembourg*
Other actions taken In the first meeting of the
Committee of Eighteen included the appointment of the Fin
ancial and Military Subcommittees*.

The former was to pre

pare A Study of financial s a n c t i o n s a n d the latter was to
complete the list of arms to be Included under Proposal I*
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At It» meéting on Ootol>®r 12| the Co-^ordlnation
CoOTuittee* realls&ing that the ability of states to Impose
sanctions depended on the passage of appropiate legisla-»
tlon# decided on the policy of setting a future date when
each measure would become effective»

Thla would allow

those countries in question the necessary time to enact any
necessary legislation»

Thougÿa the members had accepted

their obligations under the Covenant, many had not bothered
to provide
In

the necessary laws

to carry them out#

another procedural decision the committee de«

elded against communicating its activities to non^members*
It concluded that in order to avoid provoking unfavorable
opinions, the committee would not take this action until it
had a complete plan worked out that could be put into opera^
tion.

Thus any controversy would be threshed out by the

committoe alone
On

the same day, the Committee of Eighteen began

Its considération of economic measures to be taken against
Italy#

Eden suggested that the simplest step would be for

the members to cut off all Imports from Italy#

If this

were done, seventy per cent of Itmly*s export trade would
be affected#

Such a reduction would cause a strain on her

lOLiM.Q.J.S.S.

p. 36.
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economy»

Since haate waa Important^ tbla would constitute

ttoxne action that could he impcaed through existing customs
regulations^ while the problem of stopping exports of cer
tain items to Italy was being conaldered»^^
But the French delegate# Coulondre# took an oppo
site stand#

He wanted the procedure reversed# first an

embargo on exports to Italy# and then the trade strangulatlon*

12

There arose considerable haggling in the commit

tee over this split# which really went to the heart of the
problem*

Just what would be the nature of th© sanctions?

Hot ta of Switzerland summed up the controversy when he
said that the sanctions should be as effective as possible#
but if the members hoped that the dispute could be settled
by conciliation# then the measures should not be irritat
ing to Italy
Eden replied that Kotta waa perhaps correct# but
that he felt the measures would be less irritating if they
were immediately# rather th#m graduailly# effective*

Hop

ing to keep his proposal from having to go to a subcommit
tee# Eden contended that the Committee of Eighteen could

^4bl d . . p. 37,
p. 37,
p. li,2.
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easily decide the Issue# the Co-ordination Committee could
pass It# and it could be put into effect before the French
proposal ever left the present body#^^
This impaase resulted in an adjoument until Octo
ber 111»

Before returning to the controversy over the eco

nomic sanctions# the Oosmlttee of Eighteen acted on the
proposal submitted by the Financial Subcommittee# which
was amended and sent on to the Co-ordination OoBmittee#
The latter body passed the financial sanction# or Proposal
II# later the same day*^^
This second sanction stipulated that all loans to
the Italian Government were to cease# as well all banking
and other credits*

Ito loans were to be made to or for any

public authority# person# or corporation in Italy or her
territories#

The governments enforcing this financial

sanction were to take wh»t steps they could under existing
legislation and were to pass any further laws needed so
that Proposal II could be put into effect by the last day
of October»
After disposing of Proposal II# the Cousmittee of
Eighteen returned to the discussion of economic sanctions*

% b t a . . p, U2,
^% b l d .. pp* 52» 16,
pp. 130- 31.

For full text seo Arrondlx,
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Coulondre*» motion to e«t up e aubcommittee to deal with
both the French and Britieh euggestlons won the dmy, although
Eden never ceased Insisting that a subeommlttee study waa
unnecessary for cutting off Imports from Itnly»

With the

under»tending that his proposal would go Into effect in any
ease by October 13, Eden conceded his point to the French*
The Committee of Eighteen, through the Go*»ordination
Comltte®, made certain efforts to facilitate the execution
of the provisions for mutual support called for in para*»
graph 3 of Article 16*

In order to minimise loss and in*#

convenience when acting under Article 16, the members had
agreed to "mutually support one another#"

These provisions

were a device to equalise the burden as much as possible
and a reassurance th^it the entire momberstiip would eolloc*»
tlvely resist any threats aimed at them by an aggressor*
As a draft proposal, but not a proposal per se, both com*»
mlttees passed statements reaffirming the idea embodied in
paragraph 3*

16

The Committee of Eighteen established a

suboommltteo the same day to prepare a fonoial draft on
mutual support, but it was felt that some statement on the
subject should bo made right away#

This would minimize the

fear of some nations that they might bear more than their

pp. 15, ,5li.
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shftre of tho burden*
Tho next action to be taken was on October 16 on
the reooïîBnendatlônô of the military and legal subooi»alttees#
To make sure that the list of a m s placed under embargo
would be complete^ the Military Subcommittee had been formed*
On October 15 it reported on the items It felt should bé in-»
eluded under Proposal I#

The Committee of Eighteen passed

the recommendations on to the Co*»ordinisttlon Cormittec in the
form of Proposal I A* which was put Into Immediate effect
The other action wms acceptance of a legal resolution which
called upon the states to »iake possible any required legis
lation to fulfill the obligations under Article l6«^®
Three days later^ the Subcomittee on Economic
Measures rendered its report, with draft proposals on the
prohibition of importing goods from Italy and the export
ing of certain others to Italy*

The Subcommittee on Mutual

Support submitted its recommendations for that purpose also*
In the Committee of Eighteen disagreement arose over tho sug
gested dates when the economic sanctions should bccomo of-*
fective*

Eden wanted the members to determine this by no

later than October 31*

^^Xbid,, p, 63*

^% b l d . . p. 60.

He finally won his point#

See Appendix, yp. 128-29.
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Comraifcte© deleted a paragraph from the Mutual Support recom^
mendatIon that would have discouraged trade with members
or non-members wîxo refused to carry out the proposals de^
signed to stop the Italian aggression.

The Committee made

this decision because It felt that the terms which had es-»
tabllshed Its jurisdiction would not sllow such a recoramondation.

It would in effect be a punitive action» and ohly

the Council or the Assembly could act in such a case.
After this limited debate, Proposal III, the embar
go on receiving Italian imports, Proposal IV, the embargo
on the exporting of certain items not included under Pro
posal I to Italy, and Proposal V, the provisions for mutual
support, were passed by the Co-ordinatlcn CoaHnittee#^^
The first of those made illegal all imports from
Italy other than silver or gold.

Exceptions to this gen

eral rule were (1) articles Jjmported from Italy to which
processing added more than 2$ per cent to their value,
(2} goods already en route at the time of the effective date
of the enforcement, and (3) the personal belongings of trav
elers from Itf»ly,

The members were to notify the Oomtalttee

of Co-ordination by October 28 when they could put these
sanctions into force*

pp, 20, 2L-25, For full text of these
proposals see Appendix, pp, 131-35*
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Proposal IV addad boasts of burden and certain minersla to Proposal I*

Oovermients were to insure that the

Items contslned under this sanction would not be allowed
to reach Italy through Indirect routes or rd**exportatlon.
ÏÎO goods were to be exempted from this embargo except those
already era route.

The effective date of this proposal was

to bo deteriolned by the Co-ordination Committee on October
31.
Proposal V was a detailed reiteration of the earlier
draft resolution made In the t»ro committees on mutual
port#

It was an attempt to increase the trade between the

states enforcing sanctions In order to offset the loss of
Italian markets# as well as to add stimulus for enforce
ment#

Under its terms# the Committee of Eighteen was to

function as an assistance body to consider particular prob
lems of individual states in bringing the second part of
the proposal Into operation#
Before closing the first session of the Co-ordina
tion Committee on October 19# two more resolutions were
passed#

Bince sanctions were being handled through an un

official organ of the League of Hatlona, the Committee of
Eighteen was instructed to remain la being#

This was prob

ably done to maintain a facade of authority and encourage
ment, though as much was nCit admitted*

The Co-ordination
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Committee also decided that the time had come to notify the
non-mciabers officially of the proposed action against Italy#
The decision was made to communicate to these governments
the reeoîîMended sanctions^ pertinent documents relating to
the entire dispute, the October 7 minutes of the Council^
and the October 9-11 minutes of the Assembly*

These were

the minutes of che meetings that had declared Italy to be
an aggressor and that hsd made the decision
tionSf respectively#

to apply sane-*

In polite words* all non-member gov

ernments were invited to notify the committee of any actions
they might be taking under the circumstances#^^
The fifty two members of the Co-ordination Committee
then adjourned*'and with some feeling of satisfaction#
Within less then two weeks they had been able to agree on
five proposals which they hoped would cause Italy to capit
ulate#

But any feeling of self-congratulation should have

been accompanied by oome pangs of conscience#

Ifotvrithe tend

ing the feeling on the part of the members that rapid action
had been taken, the action could hîi've been taken even more
quickly#

The French maneuvers to delay adoption of Propo

sals III and IV were an indication of unnecessary delays#
The very nature of the proposals calls forth another charge

^^Ibid#, p# 27#

See Appendix# pp. 13&-37.
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that praise should be used with discretion*

When the pro

visions of Article 16 are compared with the decisions tsken,
the Inadequacy of the cosnmitte©*s work is |;laring#

There

was never any consideration in these debates of any mill-*
tar y action on the part of the jsembers, and only the dele
gate froRL South Africa# and then only once* had the courage
to suggest a diplomatic rupture with Italy*

This was in

the first meeting of the Comlttee^of Eighteen* but the ob
vious silence which greeted his suggestion quickly encour
aged him to forget It*^^
An analysis of the measures that were adopted shows
that the spirit of complete severance of ooîîsmeroial inter
course was deliberately Ignored*

The attempt to cripple

Mussolini*a war potential was a ludicrous one, for there
was no prohibition on fuel items nor on two of war* s most
necessary commodities, steel and iron ore*

While a later

attempt was made to include these basic items, the Commit
tee would have done well to consider these potentials in its
first session*

If Eden was correct in stating that final

effeotiveneas depended on immediate effectiveness, the adjouriment was premature*
X/ltvinoff alone spoke out against the feeling of

Zllbld.. p. 20.

n
8uoee08«

H q charged that the sioaaurca had not resulted from

an exhaustive attempt hj the committee to take all the xueasurea It could to atop Italy*.

Ho warned the members that

the action® taken thus far against Italy should not be con^
sldared an adequate precedent for applying Article 16 in
future cases*

He deplored the hesitancy of some states to

adopt the proposed m e «sures because of friendship* economic
ties* and kinship— ^reasons put forth by Hungary* Austria*
and Switzerland*

He felt th^t success lay anly In the sot

of universal acknowledgment of obligations* and that univer-^
sality was not present*

22

But on the other hand was this first session po un-*suocessful?

It is true that the measures

sufficiently drastic to nieetthe needs
least some attempt was made.

taken were not

of the hour* but at

It was unfortunate that more

comprehensive measures were not taken ©t the time when the
majority of the members

were receptive

tions* but* on the other band, perhaps
as was possible*

to the idea of aanc^
as much was obtained

While the futile hope for cone ill ?»tIon had

not seised most of the momocrs yet in October* Prance was
still able to limit the sreope of the sanctions from the very
first*

Lack of universal support may have influenced the

p. 27.
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declalon to limit the aanotlona, ernd, since collective cecurlty per ae has never been realised universally* the ac
tion may represent the mo?t practical optimum that was
possible*

Had the members of the League later continued

in the same direction they had originally taken on October
11* when the decision was mad© to apply Article 16* per
haps there still would have been time to coerce Italy*

Un

fortunately the original spirit degenerated Into political
opportunism in the last raonthn of 1935# and positive ac
tions reverted into meaningless motions*
There is acme defense* however,

the first place*

the member© had no precedent to follow* and the mere fact
that they were able to come together and agree on even
partial measure© was a step forward*

Secondly* the tech

nical machinery which was set up to carry forward the mem
bers* decisions proved to be workable#

There was nothing

to indicate that sanctions would not be a feasible method
to halt Italy*
Prom the closing of the first session of the Co
ordination Committee on October 19 until sanctions were
lifted in July of the following year* no further embargoes
were adopted#

The second session of this body lasted only

three days# from October 31 until November 2#

It did not

meet again until July 6* when it reconmended th>?t sanctions
be lifted*
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During Its eecond session, a report waô given by
the Chalr%R&n on the co cep tance of the proposals by the gov*»
eminent a of the world#

Proposal 1$ the aras ejobargo, had

been accepted by fifty governments, who had or would soon
put it Into effect.

Forty nine governments were ready to

put Proposal II, the financial embargo. Into effect; forty
eight favorable replies had been received on Proposals III
and IŸ, the economic embargoes; and thirty nine governments
had accepted the principle of Proposal V which contained
the provisions for mutual

apport.

Because of the slow eom-

munloation facilities to some areps, this was nob consld**
ered a complete
On the basis of these replies, the Committee of
Eighteen recommended that the effective dates of epplicà»*
tlon for Proposals II, III, and IV should be November 15,
1935#

Althou^ÿ) the delay would be of great benefit to

Italy, the Ooimittee of Eighteen felt that the additional
time was needed to allow states to provide for enforcing
legislation.^^

If the members were anxious to proceed with

the enforcement of the sanctions, it seems there was no
reason to excuse such a long delay for want of national

1Ij6,
p, 8.

p. 7.
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authority#

Why could not the enforcement have been placed

on an ’’aa-Boon-aa'-poaslble’’ arrangement?

The Co-ordination

CoKaalttee accepted the recommended date.
Two very interesting speeches wore mad© before the
members of the Co-ordination Committee on Kovember 2*

The

first was made by I^avali^ who reiterated France*a intentions
of carrying out the obligations of the Covenant^ but, remi
niscent of tho speech he had made before the Assonbly on
September 13, he once again emphasized the inpox’tano© of
**concillation and peaceful settlement»**

Because he had

such great faith that such a settlement could be found# he
informed his listeners th^t Franc© and Great Britain would
continue to try to find a basis for negotiation#^^
Hoar© followed Laval and told the members th^t he
regretted that such steps had had to be taken against Italy#
but that no other course seemed possible.

He Informed the

oomaitt©© that certain discussions had been going on be
tween France, Great Britain, and Italy, but only of a ten-**
tative nature#

He went on to assure his listeners that

nothing was going to be done behind the League's back, and
that any suggestions would have to be agree(?ble to both the
League of Nations and the two parties concerned,^

^%bl<3.. »J. S.
^h b i d . . p. 9.
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with these statements, the sanction pover$ were
first Inforiued of the Impending Hoare-Laval rlan*

Once the

terms of the plan wore made public, the determination to
maintain and Increase sanctions against Italy began to
wane#

With these pronouncements of high political offi

cials from the two leading powers In the LeAgue, the time
was not far away when indecision would rule.
After Ho are and Lavnl had finished, v>?n Zeeland,
the Prime Minister of Bel^^ium, rose to applaud the announcement*

27

Ho expressed his hope that the committee

would give to Hoare and Laval its official mandate to do
what they could to end the war#

But the Committee of

Eighteen was not an official organ of the League, and had
been set up for the sole purpose of dealing with sanctions.
It could not therefore grant such a license.

The coîïimit-

tee did not vote on the suggestion, and passed over van
Zeeland*s request with the Chairman stating thmt the mem
bers gave the efforts their approval.
This expression of hop® that ah equitable settle
ment could be reached outside of the League was taken, by
Laval and Hoare to be a mandate, whether that was the com
mittee* s real intention or not*

It was not long before

^^Welters believes van Zeeland*» actions were
according to plan, Walters, p# 661|,
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these two bad made the second attempt to reach an extra*
League settlement while the dispute was still under the
Leaguers consideration*

The fact that Kussolini had scoffed

et the proposals made to him on the occasion of the first
try did not bother Hoare and Laval*

They were ready to

risk another attempt In hop# that the League would not have
to commit Itself to a policy of stronger sanctions*
Returning to the work of Implementing the enforce
ment of sanctions^ two more resolutions were passed by the
Co-ordination Committee on November 2#^^

With reference

to Proposal III# the committee decided that any contracts
that had been paid In full by October 19 would not be af
fected by the November 19 date# and that debts owed to mem
bers by Italy would remain valid*

Also# any countries that

experienced extreme hardship due to Italian non-payment of
debts would be compensated for such losses

through the

Mutual Support arrangement,a In Article 16.
Although the Oo-ordlnation Committee adjourned on
the second# the Committee of Eighteen remained in session
until November 6 *

It passed amendments during this time

to all of the embargoes except that on arms*
financial embargo more easily, Lropos&l IX

•At. 1L 6, pp. ÎI.6-50*
Appendix, pp. 138- 39.

To manage the

A was agreed on.

For full texbs see

80
The sanctions statds wera to accept iiq new Italian lira in
the clearing accounta in the countries exporting items to
Italy for payment.

In or^îer to assure that Itily would

have to make payment on goods she had iijqpoi’ted, the pur
chase price paid for Italian goods was placed in a clearing
account from which payment would be made on debte owed by
Italy*

The amendment to the embargo on receiving Itall«?,n

goods excepted certain items,

borne of these included bookS|

newspapers# periodicals# maps# and printed music*
Host significant; of the amendment;s was Proposal
IV A*

Walter Riddell# the Canadian representative# asked

that the list of Items under Proposal IV be expanded to In
clude more oommoditlea*

He ventured to speak for tho en

tire committee when he said all knew that the present llGt
was not as comprehensive as it should be# particular!',^ be
cause there was no restriction on iron ore# coal# steel or
petroleum products*

He proposed that# sine,» the Conmittee

of Eighteen was charged with making reoonmiendations to the
various governments# it could well consider placing these
items under embargo.

After examining the possibility#

Riddell concluded by saying that the coMlttee could put
such embargoes into effect when it felt they would be suc
cessful*^^

29Ibid.# p. 33*
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D uboow ltW e

o« tb$

w$^%ing

pA$»0d f'jroi'?oaail IV A#
AUgg$&tlù%*

th«>

t W Ooimltt## of
in

wt)leh

Uow#V4^r#

A w&A ït© ln 4 1 e « itiô n wh#%% th #

po#%l would W o o m e

The wrdlr^s etlpulmwd th«t

the nec»R 8#$^ oondltlof&e would h^ve to be M e l 1mod# but no
condition# were 11# tod «
the ôcœdttee î^emoer»

The oordltiooe In the mlnde of

were f^robebly theee»^^

%hea would

the $%m;bera who fumlebed a eubetentiel ehere of tho#e
Itoise be m^ee&ble to euoh e proj^o«#i'i

To whet oKtemt

would Greet Orlt&ln and Frenee eu;port the enforoeiwnt of
eucb meeeuM#?

Theee were no email ^^robleme» and the s^oeei«

billti of den;^ing theee baele Iteme to

eroueed

eonaid-*

ereble interest >&n4 ooiftrover#y 1^ end out of the League#
It is little wonder th%t the Coea&lttee of Elî^uoen felt It
had done ell it could for «»ae Miuent#
Conclttdlnigj ite%# of buetress for the es>mlttee In
this session were the adoption of froposel IV S end a reso^
lotion on excepting co^^tmots that ceme after the October
19 deadline#

The f c m e r called on the members to deter*

mine the final destination of sXl good® exported i^ioh were
restricted h/ Proposal IV#

In the evsDt of an

^^Tojnbee, pp* 27S^7^»
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Increase to neutrals« they were to make sure that Italy was
not receiving some portion of them via indirect routes*
The last resolution permitted the execution of any contracts
made to buy Italian goods# if these goods were of essential
importance to the Importing state# or If not less than 20
per cent of the total sums due were paid b/ October 19^
It can be seen from the general nature of the pro-*
posais and recommendations agreed upon In the second session
of the conanittee that the Initial momentum was slowing down*
Aside from the pending threats of Proposal IV A, Italy* a
position was no worse than it had been at the end of the
first session*

Most of che recent measures were aimed pri-*

mar 11y at lessening the discomforts of states applying
sanctions*

Certainly the delay until November l8, before

the economic sanctions would take effect# was a break for
Italy#

Since the resolutions passed in this session dealt

mostly with Imports, Italy had until the time of the effec
tive date a good opportunity to ley in a future supply of
the items that would then be affected.

Though Italy*s

future was dark, it was by no meana desperate.
The first Itelimn reply to the sanctions came on
November 11 In a strongly worded protest to all the members
31

applying sanotlons*"^

She again charged the members with

3^Documents on International Affairs* 1935# P* 216*
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falling to appraclat® tho

service Italy was render*

Ing mankind In bringing olvlliaatlon to JEthlopla*

The

massee there were greeting Italien troops as their liber*
atorSf slaves were being freed, and the people of Ethiopia
were placing such faith in Italy that it had now become her
great duty to continue the great civilising service she had
begun.

After this modest assertion, Italy claimed that aaxic*

tions were illegal#

Italy had not been accorded her righta

under the Covenant, because no vote to impose sanctions had
ever been taken in an official League organ#

In applying

sanctions, the members were acting in an unjust and arbi
trary manner#
She finished her protêtst with a threat of retalia
tion#

She warned that sanctions would be followed by coun

ter-sanctions#

She might have to alter the current rates

of exchange, but, most important, the entire concept of
sanctions and counter-sanetlona would have the effect of
creating ill feelings that could lest long after enforce
ment had ceased#

Her closing threat intimated that, should

the unjust policy be continued, Italy would have to consid
er withdrawing from the League of Nations#

By all of this,

Italy acknowledged thf^t even the inadequate sanctions had
some effect on her economy and public morale#
The Committee of Eighteen had not settled on a
definite meeting date when it adjourned on November 6,

although It was understood that the next meeting would be
held towards the end of November*

In this interlude^ at

tention was turned from the debates on sanctions to the
events outside of the league# In the first two months of
%
the war# Italy had not been able to achieve the rapid mili
tary victory that she had anticipated#
pending rainy season in

Because of the im

the timetable had to be

followed closely# and Mussolini was elready behind schedule«
He was becoming uneasy over the prospects of strengthened
sanctions and decided that he should invest In some insur
ance*

Laval seemed to be the best agent to deal with# so

Mussolini moved some of his troops to the French border,
Talk was even spread around that the Riviera might be
bombed*

Walters even wonders if these maneuvers were not

taken at the suggestion of Lavsl so that the task of winning
Great Britain* s support to his plan might be made easier,
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Laval was under a good deal of pressure to do Mussolini a
service# and# since the oil embargo was the latter*a great
est concern at the moment# except victory of course# Laval
hit upon a plan that would bring something as good as vic
tory# If accepted#

Bven If this should not be the case# at

least the oil embargo could be delayed for a while longer*

3^Walters# p, 667*
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When V^aeoneollos

to eall % scooting of the

Ccnrnntttee of Eighteen for Bove%%ber 29 to eonelder the repile#

opinion® of «.he .government® to the proposed addl^

tione in Proposal IV k$ Level csade en urgent request that
the coi»lttoe*e meeting he delayed until December 12#
Keraly being In the poaition to refuse the wishes of the
Eesd of the French Government# Yaseoncellos complied#

thus

Level delivered to Mussolini on one sccount# and he could
now work out the preparations for the second delivery#

CHAfîEE IV
T H E L E A G U E LOSES ITS WILL

The faet that Laval had managed to have the sched
uled meeting of the Committee of Eighteen postponed, the
Increasing prominence given to a policy of conciliation,
and the threats emanating from Rome combined to sound the
death knell for any further extension of sanctionsè

Inde

cision had at last tsken precedence over the will to suc
ceed#

The final effort to coerce Italy was made on November

6, 1935* when the Committee of Eighteen approved the prin
ciple of the oil sanction*

The League might yet win a few

battles against Italy, but it had lost the will to gain
victory,
Tho French and British Governments had decided to
make another bilateral attempt to reconcile the disputants,
and the outcome of the Paris negotiations early in December
was the Hoare-Laval Flan,^ which was officially transmitted
to the Governments of Italy and Ethiopia on December 11 and
13* respeotlvely*
The Hoare-Laval flan oon&isted of two parts*

^For full text see Appendix* pp* lLj.l-U3
86
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the first, it authorized an exchange of territories.

Italy

would have received In essence that territory which she had
already conquered and occupied, and Ethiopia would have been
compensated by receiving an outlet to the sem, preferably
the Italian port of Asab in Eritrea,

The second portion of

the plan proposed the creation of a zone of economlo expan
sion and settlement in Southern Ethiopia for the benefit of
Italy*

By the terms of the proposal, It«ly would heve been

able to extend eventual political control over this portion
of Ethiopia also.

Italy would be acquiring this area under

the pretense that ”tho beast of prey was not devouring his
prey when he was devouring It**2
In the notifieetion of the plan that was sent to
Italy, the two powers said they would tske tho necessary
steps to submit the plan to the Comrûittea of Five In the
event that the Italian Government accepted it as a basis
for negotiation.

Furthermore, ^in that ease the meeting

of the Committee might modify the objéct of the meeting of
the Committee of Eighteen which is fixed for the same da y * **3
Thus the two governments held out the promise to Mussolini
that if he should accept the plan, they would endeavor to

^Toynbee, p, 301,
3Highley, p, 202.
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prevent the Committee of Eighteen from Imposing the oil
s&nctlon«
When the Conmlttee of Eighteen aseembledi on Deoem-*
her 12, 193$# the Italian reply had not yet been received;
After Laval and Eden had sunuaarlaed the British and French
negotiations, Tytua KLomamlekl, the folish delegate to the
coimnittee, outlined a series of arguments perfectly in ac
cord with the Anglo**French communication to Kussolini,

He

asserted that the members of the Committee of Eighteen were
obligated to use discretion pnd not take any action that
might impinge upon the competence of the Council which
would have to make a decision on the plan*

The committee

should do nothing to prejudice the political situation in
which the Council would have to work in its efforts to re
store p e a c e C o n s e q u e n t l y , on December 13, the chairman
of the committee issued a statement which, with the tacit
assent of ell but two of the members, declared that the
Committee of Eighteen would not make any fresh decisions
at that time for fear of prejudicing the progress of the
negotiations in the Council*-^
'The Assembly was slap influenced by the desire to
refrain from entering into the dispute just then*

On
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December 12# before hie Government had received the text
of the plan# the Ethiopian representative requested that
tho Assembly be convened for a debate on the proposals#
The President of the Assembly# however# decided that It
would be preferable for the Assembly to await the outcome
of the debate In thé Council# Inasmuch as the Council was
the organ to which the dispute had been originally sub
mitted#^
The Council had received the plan on Deceinber 13#
but was not called into session until December 13#

Then

It was called to consider the plan because the members of
the Committee of Five# other thsn Eden and Laval# decided
that the Committee was not competent to examine such pro
posals#

On the day that the Council met# Hoare resigned#

The disclosure of the terms of the plan had caused serious
reverberations in Great Britain# and the Government had
sacrificed Hoare*

This# combined with the opposition of

the Ethiopian Government# sealed the fate of the proposals#
In any event# the Council decided to postpone any discussion
until the two governments had made their official replies#
It thanked the authors of the plan and then instructed the
Committee of Thirteen to re-exrmln® the entire situation#

p. 1^2, J»n., 1936.
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^bearing In mind the provislona of tha

C o v e n a n t .

^7

The avanta In tba Laagn© of Katlonsj from the an^
nouncement of the Hoere-Laval 1*1an on the tenth to the
close of the Council session on the eighteenth, were high*
ly significant In the ibeague^s later actions In the dispute»
The emphasis had now gone from sanctions to conciliation,
a regretable alteration in the League *s policy.

Did the

Committee of Eighteen really have an obligation to refrain
from extending the sanctions to oil, or was the presence
of the Hoar©*Laval Bien an excuse to avoid angering Musso*
llnl?

Nothing In the Covenant would have prevented the

Committee of Eighteen from following Its Initial policy of
attempting to bring Italy Into line.

There was no obliga

tion in Article 16 to return to conciliatory attempts while
sanctions were In effect| so, once the members had enforced
sanctions, there was no legal reason for returning to con
ciliation.

The reversion waa ^nevertheless made, however

unfortunate, and the consequence was an indefinite post
ponement of the consideration of the oil embargo.
An Interim period* between December 19, 1935, and
February 12, 1936, followed.

There was an attempt by a

representative of the Holy See to determine a basis for a

hbid.. p,
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sattleznent between Italy and Ethiopia, but the latter broke
off these disouselona#

In another effort to Initiate the

Imposition of an oil embargo, the Ethiopian Government for«*
warded a request to the Council on January 20 for its Imme
diate application*
clal assistance*

Also Included was a request for flnanThe Committee of Thirteen reported to

the Council on January 22 that no new opportunity had pre
sented itself for a settlement of the dispute between the
two partiest which opened the way for a new attempt to put
an oil sanction in force.

While Ethiopia received some

consolation in this, her request for a loan was refused*^
The situation having changed at last, the Chairman
of the Committee of Eighteen called © meeting for January
22*

The Chairman announced that the Committee would deal

with several things, namely, a study of replies received
from the governments that had sanctions in force and the
consideration of Proposal IV A, the proposal that had been
passed by the Committee to place an embargo on iron, steel,
coal, and petroleum products.

The Chairman stated that the

conditions did not seem favorable for the application of
sanctions to iron, steel, or coal, but that a committee of

Feb.. 1936, pp. 257-Q.
9lt>ld.. p. 106,
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technical experte might he appointed to study the advlaa*^
billty of extending the emb&rgo to petroleum products.
The Committee of Eighteen then passed two resolu
tion*^

The first celled for the Committee of Experts to

make a study of tho effectlveneso of sanctions^ and the
second set up the Committee of Experts on 011$^^
On February 1 the Conanittee of Experts submitted
its report concerning the effectiveness of sanctions*

The

report noted that Proposal I* the arms embargo, had been
accepted by fifty two goverrmients, fifty of which had en
forced it % Proposal II, the atbargo on all loans or credits,
had been accepted by fifty two governments, forty eight of
which bad enforced it; Proposal III, the embargo on the
importation of all goods from Italy, hsd been accepted by
fifty governments, forty four of which h«d enforced It;
Proposal IV, the embargo on exportation to Italy of certain
items, had been accepted by fifty one governments, forty
seven of which had enforced it; and Proposal V, the pro
vision for mutual support, had been accepted by forty six
governments*

To determine the effectiveness of the sanctions,

the Committee of Experts decided to submit a questionalre
to all govornsients of the world maintaining economic

lb-8, pp. 7-9,
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relations with
The Committee of Experts on Oil was o r g a n l a n d
held its first meeting on February 3*

It appointed frora

Its members three subcommittee a to study the transports'»
tlon problem# to determine Italian supply# and to Investi
gate the consumption of petroleum products#
The task of the Committee of Experts on Oil was to
study the influence such an embargo might have on Italy* s
ability to meet her requirements for oil*

The subcommit

tees dealt with the problem from February 3 until tho time
they reported on February 6*

The result of these labors

was a report th*.t consisted of a general summary and a
statistical report to be used by the various governments
should the sanction be imposed*

The conclusions were

briefly these: (1) Italy was capable of carrying two million
tons with her own fleet; (2 ) Germany could augment this
tonnage with another 500#000 tons and the United States

200#000 tons; (3 ) therefore# if the members imposed a trans
portation embargo# Italy could still cover her requirements*
The methods of imposing an embargo were: (1) prohibit the
sale of tankers to Italy and non-members of the Leegue;
and (2 ) ask the members to prohibit their flag vessels from

Ibid,, p. 29.
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entering Italian porta*

The general ooncluaion was that

it would be very difficult to stop the oil supply to Italy#
but that the embargo* If employed* would raise the coat of
petroleum products to Italy a great deal*^^
The Couonittee of

on Oil examliied the reports

of the subcoxranitteea from the sixth until the twelfth*
During this time a report was prepared for the Oonmittee
of Eighteen and submitted on February 12#

The report noted

that Italian oil liq^orts had steadily Increesed since 1931»
but that there was no reason to believe Italy was accui;iulating stocks prior to 1935#

Consuna^tlon had probably

equaled the total purchases#

At that time Italy was con-*

siderod to have a supply adequate for no longer than two
months* and supplies en route would increase this amount
to ft three month supply#

With the exception of the United

States* the members were Italy*» greatest source of retro**
leuxa#

It was not known what course the United States would

follow in the event of such

serction* but just limiting

her exports to Italy to the pre-1935 level would make the
embargo effective#

Although Italy might use substitutes

for petroleum* it would be difficult to assess this potential#
To make an oil embargo absolutely effective, the non-member»

^^L«H.O.J,a.S. 1U8, p. 65.
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would have to comply with th* embargo# but with juat the
members applying the sanction# the cost could be made pro
hibitive#

Should such an embargo be imposed# special care

would have to be taken to prevent delivery by possible in
direct, routes*^^

Instead of taking any action on the con

clusions submitted by the oil experts# the Committee of
Eighteen sent instructions to the experts to study further
the methods of (tpplyl, g the sanction.
The Committee of Eighteen# however# never utilised
the conclusions in this second study of the Committee of
Experts on Oil*

When the Committee of Eighteen met again

on March 2 to consider the oil embargo# Etienne PIandin#
the successor to Laval# suggested that# before any discus
sion of Proposal XV A# the oil sanction, cam© up# a new
attempt should be made by the Committee of Thirteen to ap
peal to the belligerents to stop hostilities*^^

Eden said

that his goverhment was ready to support the embargo on oil
if other governments would agree# but# since the Committee
of Eighteen still had to consider Proposal IV Â# ha had no
objection to Fl&ndln^s suggestion*
Had the same spirit of the late months of 1935 still

^hbld.. p. 67.
ili9, p. 12
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animated the CoRsaalttee of eighteen, Flandln* a suggestion
would have met with no eooej|,^tanoe, hut the sanctions st&tes
had been too disillusioned by. recent events to oppose the
French*

Rather than increase the pressure on Italy to stop

the hostilities* the decision was made to ask her to stop*
The Committee of Thirteen »iôt the next day* March 3*
arid dispatched a telegram to the belligerents directing to
them an urgent appeal to open negotiations limed lately with
a view to ending the hostilities and restoring peace within
the frm%ework of the League and the Covenant*

For the first

time since the war had begun* a definite deadline* March 10*
was set for the replies
Ethiopia promptly accepted the appeal* "subject to
the provisions of the Covenant being respected*" and ordered
her Permanent Delegate to the League to be at the disposal
of the Committee#

But before the Italian reply had been

received* there occurred the German military reoccupation
of the Rhineland on March 7* an event'that made any oil
embargo politically Impossible*

France* above all* would

never agree because of the disastrous effect such a step
would have on rf*lations with Mussolini#

The significance

of the German action was soon felt* and the meeting of the

April, 1936, p. 395.
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Conaalttôe of Xhirteoxi which bad been scheduled for March 10
waa postponed while the Council considered the Pranco-Gar^
%an situation#

By this tlsia the divergence between France

and Great Britain had become pronounced, and it was clear
that the foraer could no longer be counted upon to support
any increased pressure on Itely#

Fronce deemed Mussolini

friendship morn vital than over
The Committee of Thirteen met again on March 23#
but no new decisions were made#

There was no acknowledge

Eient of either success or failure In the ourrenb program
of conciliation#

Failure would have removed any excuse

for continued postponement of the oil sanction# and suecess was certainly not possible under the circumstances*
But something had to be done, so the Committee decided to
return to the method the Council had used to conclude the
Wal Wal arbitration by sending this time Madariaga# the
chairman of i-he committee, to the t$o disputants#

Eo was

to attempt to miika the necessary arrangement to bring Itialy
and ^Ethiopia together to work out a settlement within the
provisions of the Covenant#^?
Once again Ethiopia expressed her willingness to

l%lghl*y, pp. 207-8.
April, 1936, p. 398,
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cooperate, and this time even the Itellane aeemed Interested*
The Italian Government replied to the League on April 2
that a delegate would be sent to Geneva to confer with
Madariaga after Kaster*

In addition, the reply proposed

iQ
that he visit Rome for an exchange of ideas with Mussolini,
The Committee of Thirteen met again on April 8 and decided
that the League*s representative would not be sent to Rome
until conversations had been held in Geneva with the Italian
delegate*

The League was not yet ready to make its trip to

Canossa*
The outcome of the Geneva conversations revealed
that the Italians were notwilling to work within the Cove
nant to end the fighting#

They would accept either an

arndstlce or peace preliminaries as a means of ending the
hostilities, but any negotiation would h«vo to be based on
the present military situation*

In addition, the Italians

stated that only the method of direct negotiation would be
acceptable, and, while the Committee of Thirteen would be
*kept informed*^ of the progress. It would not have any
official function In the negotiations,

Ethiopia naturally

refused to enter Into any talks under cheae terms and
another Impasse e n s u e d , W i t h the failure of this attempt

pp. 1486-67
^hbld.. p, 361,
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ut conciliation^ the Committee of Thirteen a:\nounced on
April 17 that Kadarlaga*» jniaalon had been fnlfllled and
that the ci tu it ion vlth rCj^&rd to èdnelliatlon remained the
came aa at the time of ite January 23rd report> i$e*# that
the Council remained at the disposal of the parties for the
continuance of the work of conciliation#
Eden interpreted the situation aa being an oppor
tune time to extend the scope of the sanctions# and sug
gested to the Council that it should take up such a con
sideration*

Edeut however# stood alone in the Council#

In contrast# the delegates of France# Russia# and Argen
tina expressed their desire to intensify efforts toward
conciliation and not further sanctions#

The tone of their

speeches Indicated that the concern over Germany’s inten
tions was greater than their concern for Ethiopia#

Paul-

Bel cour# the French represent)» tire in the Assembly# said
that# if the league was to meet the present threat in
Europe# peace was needed in Ethiopia# and that Italy’s co
operation would be necessary to a European settlement*
Attitudes like this naturally did not favor a strengthened
aanotions policy*
The final attempt made by the Council to end the

gOlbld«. p. 389,
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var waa In the form of a résolution that was passed on
April 2 0 # ^

The resolution expressed regret that the last

effort made by the Committee of Thirteen had not succeedodj
but declared that the continuing of the war under condl*
tlons contrary to the Covenant Involved the execution of
obligations laid upon the members In such a case by the
Covenant*

A supreme appeal was made to Italy to bring the

dispute to a close with the same spirit th&t the League of
îTatlon» could expect from an original member and a perma-^
nent member of the Council#

Italy^s answer was her mill'»

t&ry victory.
The feeble optimism which inspired this appeal rap
idly dwindled#

Italian military success was gaining laoiaen-

um# and on May 2 Halle Selassie was forced to flee*

Addis

Ababa fell four days later# and on Kay 9 Mussolini announced
that the war was over#

An Italian royal decree of the same

day placed Ethiopia under Italian sovereignty*

On Kay 10

Halle S-elassie informed the Secretary-General from Jerusalem
that Ethiopia would no lorger resist the Itellan armies#
and that the decision had been amde to put an end to the
"most sweeping# the most unjust m d the moat Inhuman war of
m o d e m times

p. 393.
22
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June# 193i># p# 660*
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The Council root In its rcgul&i* spring session on
May 11 confronted with the fait accompli»

Aloisl addressed

the Council in the opening meeting, steting that, since a
state of Ethiopia no longer existed, there was no point in
keeping the dispute on its agenda.

He even suggested that

the Council should not seat the Ethiopian representative.
This action the Council would not take end Alois! withdrew.
Permitted to address the Council, the Ethiopian delegate
requested that the Council condemn the Italian Government
and at last enforce all the provisions of Article 16,

Willle

the moment was a tragic one for Ethiopia^ he said it would
be no less so for the Eeague If it did not make certain
that no state would he the victim of ambitious and unsoru««
pulous aggresslon,^^

A resolution was placed before the

Council to postpone discussion of the situation until the
members could have more time to consider the latest I t a l i c
steps and to recoimend that tha members maintain the sane*
tlons against Italy#

On May 12 the resolution passed with

the provision that the Council would reconvene on June 15
to resume deliberations on the situation#^
But the Council did not meet again until June 30,

^3ibld,# pp. SUO-Iil#
p. 5U0,
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and by that time the Italian ©uôôesa had been ouch that a
epocial meeting of the Asoembly had been called.

In light

of this^ the Co^incll washed Its hands of the entire situa*
tlon and left the matter to the Assembly*
Ihe Assembly had been convened at the request of
the Argentine Oovernment to «tudy the possibility of lift*
ing sanctions*

Kven before this the sanction front bad

been broken by the unilateral actions of Equador on April
1^.# Haiti and Liberia on June 23# and folaad on June 26#
all for the rossons that the ^

facto situation rendered

sanctions useless and that the lifting of sanctions should
be the decision of sovereign individual states# ^

Public

pronouncements in various capitals during the latter part
of June had indicated that most governments considered the
continuance of sanctions futile#

By the time the Assembly

met# tiers was little remaining support for sanctions#
although most governments were waiting to see what France
and Great Britain would do before comitting themselves#
When the Assembly met# the first item of business
was not a consideration of the future of sanctions but a
consideration of a letter that had been dispatched to
Geneva by the Italian Government#

25L,H,0,J,S,3, IgO# p# 339,
^^L.-r,0«J.3.3« Igl, pp. 19*21.
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letter was the handiwork of the new Italian Minister of
Foreign Affairs^ Count Ciano#

The letter was an atteaipt

to win for Italy a warm invitation to return to the League
as a member in good standings

Couched In clever eaplana-

tiona# the Italian side of the entire Issue was again pre*
seated to the League#

It stated that Italy had always been

receptive to any attempts that had been made to settle the
conflict# and that during March it had withheld military
pressure awaiting the outcome of the committee action»

Af*

ter the Hegus had fled# the letter continued# Italy found
Ethiopia had been left without law and order# and to com*»
ply with the wishes of the population she had assumed her
responsibility#

The entire Italian adventure In Ethiopia

had proved that# like other African populations| that of
Ethiopia was in need of direction and control#

The welcome

received by the Italian troops proved how grateful the
population was to see law and order restored#

The letter

informed the League that Italy would be glad to render re-^
ports to it concerning the progress Italy was making in its
**heavy task** of civilizing Ethiopia*
The letter concluded with an Italian declaration
again offering her support and cooperation to the League
and its work In settling the grave problems of Europe and
the world*

The Italian Government could not help but recall#

10k
however» the Immediate neeesclty for the removal
••«of such obstacles as have been and are In the way
of international cooperation which Italy sincerely
seeksf and to i^leh she la prepared to give a tangible
contribution for the sake of find maintenance of peace*
The most painful event for the Aasesibly was the
speech made on its floor by Halle S e l a s s i e , a n urgent
plea to the Assembly to take steps to restore the honor of
Ethiopia and to make sure thct such abandonment to an ag^
gressor would never be allowed to happen again*

He retold

the story of the delays that had enabled Italy to attack
Ethiopia*

He said he thought it impossible that fifty two

nations could be held in check by one aggressor» but bo-»
cause one nation had been willing to atte%%qpt to retain
Italy^s friendship by sacrificing Ethiopians independence»
the aggressor had been able to hold out against the League*
His great disappointment now was that the League was talk-»
ing of lifting the sanctions against the aggressor^ rather
than exercising the leadership necessary for the protection
of small states#

It was not the Covenant that needed re-»

form» he said» for what good are articles without the will
to enforce them?

"It is International morality that is at

stake and not the articles of the Covenant»**•
that the integrity of Ethiopia be restored»

^^Ibld.. pp. 22-25.

I ask again

What answer

10$
do I take baok to nay people?”
The Asaembly had no enswar for Halle Salasale«
Only South Africa and Hew Zealand desired to maintain the
sanctions*
On July

the threefold question facing the League

was defined by Gabriel Turbay^ the delegate from Columbia#
What would be the fate of the sanctions against Italy^ what
action would the League take In regard to Italy* s ai^noxatlon of Ethiopia* and should there be a modification of the
Covenant?

While practically all the speakers deplored and

regretted the Leaguers failure to halt the Italians* none
was prepared to attempt to rectify the situation*

It was

then generally considered that the only means to accomplish
a rectification would be through military action against
Italy* a move that was never given any consideration*

That

decision already had bean made on September 10* 1935# in
the agreement made between Ho are and Laval* and the sltua^
tlon in July of 193& was even less favorable to irdlitary
sanctions*

Since economic sanctions would b® useless if

continued* the decision was made to lift them#
The logic of this kind of reasoning was questioned
by the delegate from South Africa#

He asked if the nations

that imposed the aEmotions made the successful resistance
of Ethiopia a condition to the carrying out of their obliga
tions#

Arguing that making such a condition was not
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compatible with the Covenant# he aaid that the annexation
of Ethiopia by Italy had resulted in the very situation the
League was created to prevent# and the obligation to aid
the Ethiopia never was greater*^®
Fearing that the Assembly was not going to take
any initiative on its own# on July 3 the Ethiopian delegate
introduced two draft resolutions*

One obligated

the mem

ber» to recognise no annexation by force# and the other
recommended that the members aiake available a loan to
29
Ethiopia under the provisions of Article 16*
At the same meeting# the Assembly authorised its
General Coimittee to draft proposals that would take into
account the recommendations that had been made by the vari
ous speakers in the session#

An attempt was made the next

day to pass these proposals prepared by the General Commit
tee before Ethiopia had had an opportunity to exasilne them#
A l t h o u ^ Ethiopia was able to prevent this# the General Com
mittee's draft was voted on before action was taken on the
Ethiopian delegate*s resolutions*
The proposals passed on the evening of July 1^.*^^

ZSlbld,. p. 29.
^9lbld.. p. 33.
p. 66.
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The draft In question recowraended that the members refrain
from recognlalng a forceful change of territory# extended
an Invitai on for the members to s u b M t proposals for lioprov^
Ing the Covenant# and recommended that the Co-^ordlnatlon
Co»imittee make the necessary arrangements for lifting the
sanctions»

Ethiopia protested the substitution of reoom^

mendations by the General Committee for the resolutions
that she had introduced# but hers was the only negative
vote»
Since the drsft of the General Committee bad ln*«
eluded the essence of the first Ethiopian draft resolution#
the Assembly was spared the discomfort of voting against
a resolution definitely Invoking a policy of non-recognl^
tlon»

Ethiopia managed to obtain a roll call vote on the

second of its resolution» (the international loan)# but
this was defeated»

Ethiopia cast the single affirmative

vote# while twenty three voted against the resolution# and
twenty five abstained,

îîussolini must have been pleased.

The Oo-^ordination Commit tee was reaSiiomblod on July
6 and recommended that all sanctions against Italy should
be lifted on July IS»

The members had agreed to pay Italy^s

price for renewed collaboration In the league»
Thus the task that had been begun with the Assembly* »
recommendation of October 10# 1935# ended nine months later.

lOS
The measures tb%t had been taken against Italy had been In
line with Article 16# though polltloal and military sane-»
tlons were eliminated for reasons that the committee never
tacitly expressed*

But the contradictory policy of coer-*

cion end conciliation had wrecked the effort# and the League
of Nations was due for an agonizing reappraisal of its
abilities and goals*
The eve'"ta described in this chapter mark the most
pitiful phase of the entire dispute*

The League of Nations#

through fear of failure and fear of driving Italy from its
membership# found itself unable to act vigorously or effec
tively*
The disclosure of uhe Hoare-Laval Plan did much to
destroy the will to aid Ethiopia*

Great Britain and France#

by proposing terms so completely out of line with the
Covenant# shattered the spirit of the sanction states*
This loss of faith# combined with the diplomatic maneuver
ing of France and Italy to bring delays# resulted in ac
tions less harmful to Italy*
It was irconoelvable that the members could seri
ously expect Italy to agree to any settlements other than
on her own terms after the experiences of 1935*

It was

as if the members early in 1936 acknowledged that Italy
would be victorious# but to save their own feces they
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continued the pretense of abiding by the Covenant*
The Connell ^ l l e d the conftised situation to the
Assembly, but It failed to produce any measures that could
undo the realities of the past months*

Ethiopia was aban

doned to the aggressor, but the effect of this on the mem
bers was a desire to forget and not to remedy*

O K A PTfâ V

CO U CLU âlO lîS

The ezainlnatlon oî the policies of the League of
Nations in the Italo-^Ethloplon Conflict produces two funda«*
mentally different conclusions#

One of these concerns the

technical considerations of such an experiment;# and the
other concerns the political influences; operating in and
out of the League that so greatly prejudiced its operations#
These latter considermtlons proved to be the decisive fac
tor#
Hoare once admitted to the House of Comoona %^

I have been terrified with the thought— I speak
very frankly to the House— that we might lead Abyssinia
0X1 to think that the League could do more than it can
do# that in the end we should find a terrible moment
of disillusionment in which it might be that Abyssinia
would be destroyed altogether as en independent State#
Hoare's fears were justified# but in speaking of the
League failing a further qualification is necessary#

If

''members" and "League" are considered synonymous the blame
can be placed on the League of Katlons# but if "League" de
notes the "Covenant"# the charge is unjust#

19

It was the

3^7«Parliamentary Debates# December
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members and not the Covenant who were rei^ponslbl® for
Ethiopia's false hopeA*
The first charge to be leveled against the members
proceeds from their failure to abide by Article 8 of the
Covenantt which called on the members to limit their na
tional armaments*

Had the ideal of disarmament, been real

ised, the successful maintenance of the peace might have
been possible*

Blame for this breach, significant as it

wasj cannot be individually assessed, but the lack of a
disarmament agreement was the first step towards a new
period of warfare.
The next charge against a member arises from Italy's
unilateral violation of Article 10,

Cnee determined to

conquer Ethiopia, Italy may have attew^ted to excuse her
actions by degrading Ethiopia, but the fact remains that
Italian aggression yas another violation of the Covenant,
Responsibility on this occasion, however, was a simple mat-*
ter to determine#
The first occasion within the dispute itself when
the members deserve criticism was the Council's decision to
delay the application of Article IX»

This action h^d been

requested by the Ethiopian Government on January 3, 1935,
after the many attempts at direct negotiations with Italy
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had failed*^

The meiaber» eeemed ready to take this stop

when they placed the dispute on the Council*s agenda, but
political maneuvering by the Italians won a postponement
of any discussions until the Council*s next session*

In

defense of the League of Hatlons It may be said that It was
Ethiopia*» Intention that the provisions of Article 11 were
to be employed solely to facilitate the settlement of the
Wal Wal Incident#

Once the two had agreed to pursue fur-»

ther talks. It was no longer incumbent on the Council to
give the matter Its attention*

But the fact remains that

a delay was allowed which proved to be an extremely dan-^
gerous precedent*

Firm determination from the outset might

have Influenced later Italian actions*
The next occasion which deserves the same type of
scrutiny was the failure of the Council to heed Ethiopia*®
first request for the application of Article 1$*

After the

direct talks, in accord with the January 19 agreement, had
proved futile, Ethiopia on Kerch 17 wanted to place the en-*
tire dispute before the Council#

3

Ethiopia was not only

seeking aid in achieving a settlement of the Wal Hal Inei-»
dent, but, beyond that, she asked that the threat to the

^L.K.O.J>« Feb., 193$, p. 2$2.

April, 1933, PP. 571-72.
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peact In the military build-up in Africa be examined♦

The

Italians objected on the grounds that Article 15 would be
inapi. lie able because provisions had been made between the
two for setting up an arbitration commission.

The Italian

argument is questionable, because Ethiopia had not invoked
Artidle 15 for the,single purpose for which an arbitration
commission would be forraed, namely the settlement of Wal
Wal#

Why the Council allowed the Italian objection to

stand is not clear#

It may have been because the Council

had not yet discerned the difference between a settlement
of the Wal Wal incident and a settlement of all the issues
involved in the strained 11^lo^Ethioplan relations*

In any

eventI the Council followed its previous precedent and
postpomd the examination of the relations between the
two states*
Had the Council exerted the same efforts to con-*
ciliate in the early months of 1935 that It did after Sep
tember k$ when it finally considered the issue, there m i ^ t
still have been time to save Ethiopia from attack*

As it

was, the Council's examination osme at a time whan Musso
lini deemed his preparations adequate to add to his East
African holdings*

As the Fascists realized that the league

was reluctant to enter into the dispute, a co .»t©mpt for it
gradually grew to the point th&t there seemed little to
fear from the members*

From September onwards, Mussolini

Ilk
knew he could gain more by war than by complying with pro-*
posais for a settlement.
After the hostilities had opened and the Italians
had rejected the Committee of Five*a basis for agreement,
the Assembly took the initiative in linplament ing the prln-*
ciples of the Covenant,

The members* decision to apply

sanctions against Italy was » great victory for the League
In itself.

In the face of former failures. It now intend-»

ed to deal with one of Its most prominent members*

The

peak of the members* support of the Idea of collective
security came in October, 1935*

Impressed with the obll-

gâtions they had acknowledged by signing the Covenant, it
seemed that the members would hot abandon Ethiopia after
all.

This, however, was but a short-lived reassurance.
It will be recalled that France and Great Britain

had made an effort to bring the two sides together outside
of the League of Katlous In the three-power tsilks In Paris,
Despite the fact that Mussolini bed not accepted their
benevolent offers, the French at least were determined to
keep relations with Mussolini on a cordial level.

The im

pending threat of sanctions caused the French to seek ex
piations of this sin against Kuasolini, but, because they
did not want to see the League of îïâtîons crumble, they had
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to do aomething#

Laval gavo the answer hlmaelfî^

It was in order not to break with Great Britain and
the League that sanotlona were applied# It was in order
not to break with Italy pind provoke a war, at that time
practically certain, that sanctions wore ©pplied with
moderation#
By adopting euch a policy, France, a member of the
League of Nations, was not following the law of the Cove*
nant, but instead was fulfilling her friendship commitments
to Mussolini#

K# Paul*Boncour was once shown the notes

Laval had taken during the î»^^?nco*Italian talks in Homo in
January#

According to him, Mussolini had been granted

economic rights in Ethiopia and had been led to believe
also that France would not seriously object if a military
expedition were planned and attempted*^

Thus, diplomacy

outside of the League was a consideration that continually
influenced actions#
From the time of the Hoare-Laval proposal® until
sanctions were lifted on July 15, the members continued to
violate the spirit of the Covenant by placing the emphasis
upon, conciliation rather than upon sanction»#
was not called for in the Covenant#

Buch a policy

By desiring a negotiated

^Lulgt Vlllari, It'^lian Foreign Policy Ü 'der Pueao**.
linl# (New York; Deven*Ads»lr C
o
#
^L# B# Gamier, Europe in Decay. (London; HacMillan
& Co#, 1950), p. 17$
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«ettlement, the meintoers were asking rather than forcing
Italy to comply with her obligations*

The paramount con

cern was the great problem of peace on the continent^ not
peace In Ethiopia*

The members felt they had to continue

conciliation until It had arrived at Its goal# a peace In
Ethiopia# but not necessarily a just peace*
The members were not thinking clearly when they
placed their hopes in a negotiated peace throughout 1936#
for there were only two conditions under which Italy would
have agreed to negotiate» first# if she was under such
pressure to make her feel she had no other course left# or
secondly^ if her position assured her that a settlement
would be on her terms#

Only the first condition was oom-^

patlble with the Covenant; the latter was not#

Therefore

if the members had exerted the necessary pressure definite
ly to check Italy or to defeat her# conciliation would have
been acceptable and the Covenant would not have been vio
lated#,

But# as it was# Italy did not have to agree to a

negotiated peace unfavorable to her because her position
assured her that she could impose the desired settlement
on her victim*

6

Before conciliation was tried again after Article 16

*Hlghl®y, pp* 213-15.
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had been applied, any negotiations to be In the spirit of
the Covenant should have come only after the members had
convinced Italy that victory was Impossible*

Diplomatic

mneuvering should not have been allo'^ed to weaken the de
termination to defend Ethiopia#

But the premature nej^o-

tiations so frequent thruu^hout the entire dispute encour^
aged Italy to continue her mpi^resslon and retarded the
Le ague ^s application of pressure on

h e r #

7

One can only

conclude that the members should not have attempted any
sanctions rather than the ineffective ones they did apply*
On the brighter side are the conclusions drawn from
the technical consideration of the League*s actions.

It

was beoause of political obstacles and not technical ones
that the League foiled to check Italy#

In view of the his

tory of the technical delays in the League*a handling of
the Slno-J&psnase dispute, where the subcommittees and ex
perts used in that instance succumbed to delay, the speed
with which this same type of organs operated in the XtoloKthloplari oonfllct was remarkable#
The decision declaring that Italy had violated the
Covenant was not madi^ by the Council but by the members#
Since this was not a Judgment forced on the members, it

ÎHighley, p# 211^#
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being a group or decentralized decision instead, the Impl®-*
menting of the sanctions vas made easier#

In the entire

record of the debates on the decision that Italy had begun
an aggressive war, not one state expressed an opinion to
the contrary*

While Albania^ Austria, and Hungary an

nounced that they would not apply sanctions, the moral
feet of the verdict made it a rolstively easy matter to set
up the machinery to co-ordinate the members• efforts*

While

this machinery did not operate perfectly, the system was
still able to function adequately*

In fact, the speed with

which Proposal 1 was agreed upon proves that the system was
not at fault In explatïUng why the remaining Proposais came
forth more slowly*

If the machinery did not hold up the

arms embargo, neither should it bear the responsibility of
the alter delays caused by political reasons*
The measures that were recommended were only a por
tion of those Included in Article 16 of the Covenant*

Po

litical and military sanctions were never made a subject
of consideration*

When the conference of states met in

the Co-ordination Committee, there were no precedents to
follow, for no attempt had been made to apply Article 16,
The resolutions passed In the Assembly in I'yiX had at least
considered such an event and the members naturally were
guided by them*

The Résolutions had recognised thav there
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might bo a nooosaity for exercising some choice as to the
type of sanctions to be used as well as the degree In which
they were to be applied#

Since the League was not a uni-*

versai organization, the members early decided that only a
selective list of items should be placed under an embargo,
and thus a system of graduated sanctions came to be used#
The Co-ordination Committee had not labored lon§ be*
fore it beoaitie aware of the fact that many countries wore
not prepared to impose sanctions because they lacked the
necessary legislation*

In some countries this was simply

a neglect to have enacted the nedessary laws, while in
others it evolved from a constitutional problem#

Hero

again responsibility lies with the members concerned, for
the Resolutions of 1921 had pointed up this difficulty#
All members had been urged to make provisions in their
national law to impose Article 16.
questionable excuse at best.

It was therefore a

Certainly, if their own secu

rity had been placed in closer danger, the laws would have
Û
been forthcoming much more promptly.
The fact that the proposals did not envision a

Gsighley conoluaed that inadequate national legis
lation was not e serious factor in retarding the applica
tion of the measures passed* It was for political reasons,
for ”*#*to a large extent Government*s possessed adequate
general powers. ♦*’* p# 22$.
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coT^plôte aystera of aanctlona haa boon noted#

There waa

certainly a great discrepancy In the ones passed and the
onea called for in Article 16#

There waa never any thought

of going to the extreme of severing all trade and financial
relations between the member# and Italy or her nationals*
Even those items included in Proposals III and IV were
exempted if paid for or if en route#

Psramcunt practical

interests have more than once been superior to the dictates
of international morality I The time lag between the adop
tion of a proposal end its enforcement also presented an
added means to circumvent the moat severe effects of these
latter proposals#
The final evaluation of this phase of the League»s
activities leaves this Impression#

Italian aggression was

not halted because the members were unrealistic#

They were

not motivated by a desire to defend Ethiopia through strict
interpretation of the Covenant, but followed the dual poli
cies of conciliation and coercion#

Such an unrealistic ap

proach to the problem could only have ended In the way that
it did#

There waa not the necessary will to abide by the

principles of the Covenant#

But for that one great short-

coming^ Mussolini could have been stopped#
»

AJ?i'I?îDÎX
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RELEVANT ARTICLES OP THE LEAGUE COVENANT
Article lOf^-The Kembers of the League undertake to
respect and preserve# as against external aggression# the
territorial Integrity and existing political independence
of all Members of the League# In case of such aggression#
the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obllgatlon shall be fulfilled*
Article 11#-*^1* ioiy war or threat of war# whether
irnmedietely affecting any of the Members of the L©a?^ue or
not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole
,League, and the League shall take «my action that may be
deemed wise end effectuel to safeguard the peace of nations#
In case any such' emergency should arise, the Secretary-Gen
eral shall, on the request of any Member of the League,
forthwith summon a meeting of the Council*
2, It is also declared to be the friendly right of
each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the
Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affect
ing international relations which threatens to disturb in
ternational peace or the good understanding between nations
upon which peace depends.
Article 12.— 1* The Members of the League agree that,
if there should arise between them any dispute likely to
lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to
arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the
Council, and they agree In no case to resort to war until
three months after the award by the arbitrators or the Ju
dicial decision, or the report by the Council*
2* In any ease under this Article, the award of the
arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be made within
a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be
made within six months after the submission of the dispute*
Article 13.— 1* The Members of the League ngre©
that^ whenever any dispute shall arise between them which
they recognise to be suitable tor submission to arbitration
or judicial settlement,
which cannot be satisfactorily
settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subjectmatter to arbitration or judicial settlement.,*.
k* The Members of the League agree that they will
carry out in full good faith any award or decision that may
be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against
any Member of the League that complies therewith* In the
event of any failure to carry out such an award or decision,
the Council shall propose what steps should be tsken to
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glvô affect thereto*
Article 15*— 1# If there should arise between Mem
bers of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture#
which is not submitted to arbitration or Judicial settle
ment in accordance with Article 13# the Members of the
League agree that they will submit the matter to the Coun
cil* Any party to the dispute may effect such submission
by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the
Secretary-General# who will make all necessary arrangements
for a full investigation and consideration thereof#
2* For this purpose the parties to the dispute will
communicate to the Secretary-General# as promptly as poss
ible# statements of their case# with all the relevant facts
and papers# and the Council may forthwith direct the pub
lication thereof#
3* The Council shall endeavour to effect a settle
ment of the dispute# and if such efforts are successful# a
statement shall be made public giving such facts and expla
nations regarding the dispute and the terras of settlement
thereof as the Council may deem appropriate*
1;» If the dispute is not thus settled# the Council#
either unanimously or by a majority vote, shall mnke and
publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the
dispute and the recommandations which are deemed Just and
proper In regard thereto*
5* Any Member of the League represented on the Coun
cil may make a public statement of the facts of the dispute
and of its conclusions regarding the same*
6. If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed
to by the members thereof# other than the representatives
of one or more of the parties to the dispute# the Members
of the League agree that they will not go to war with any
party to the dispute which complies with the recommenda
tions of the report*
7* If the Council fails to reach a report Which is
unanimously agreed to by the members thereof# other than the
representatives of one or more of the parties to the dis
pute# the Members of the League reserve to themselves the
right to take such action as they shall consider necessary
for the'maintenance of right &nd justice.
8. If the dispute between the parties is claimed
by one of them# and is found by the Council to arise out of
a matter which by International law is solely within the
domestic Jurisdiction of that party, the Council shell so
report# and shall make no recommendation as to its settle
ments
9^ The Council may in eny case under this Article
refer the dispute to the Assembly# The dispute shall be so
referred at the request of either party to the dispute#
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provided that euoh requeat be made within fourteen days
after theeubmlasion of the dispute to the Council»
10# In any ease referred to the Assembly, all the
provisions of this Article and of Article 12, relating to
the action and powers of the Council, shall apply to the
action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report
made by the Assembly, If concurred In by the representa
tives of those Members of the league represented on the
Council and of a majority of the other Members of the
League, exclusive In each case of the representatives of
the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a
report by the Council concurred in by alltthe members there
of other than the representatives of one or more of the
parties to the dispute#
Article 16#— 1, Should any Meiaber of the League re
sort to war In disregard of Its covenants under Articles
12, 13, or 1$, it shall Ipso facto be deemed to have commit
ted an act of war against all other Members of the League,
which hereby undertake Immediately to subject it to the
severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohi
bition of all Intercourse between their nationals and the
nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention
of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse be
tween the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State and the
nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the
League or not#
2, it shall be the duty of the Council in such case
to recommend to the several Governments concerned what ef
fective military, naval, or air force the Members of the
League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to
be used to protect the covenants of the League#
3# The Members of,the League agree, further, that
they will mutually support one another in the financial and
economic measures which are taken under this Article in or
der to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from
the above measures, and that they will mutually support one
another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of
their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they
will take the necessary *steps to afford passage through
their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the
League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of
the League#
1|.# Any Member of the League which has violated any
covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a
Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in
by the representatives of all the other fiombers of the
League represented thereon*
Article 19#--The Assembly may from time to time
advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of trea
ties which have become inapplicable and the consideration
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of International conditions whose continuance might endan
ger the peace of the world*

Resolutions concerning the Economic Weapon adopted
by the League Assembly, October l|., 1921#^
1# The resolutions and the proposals for amendments
to Article 16 which have been adopted by the Assembly shall,
so long as the amendments have not been put In force in the
form required by the Covenant, constitute rules for guidance
which the Assembly recommends, as a provisional measure, to
the Council and to the Members of the League In connection
with the application of Article 16.
2* Subject to the special provisions of Article 17^
the economic measured referred to in Article 16 shall be
applicable only in the specific case referred to In this
article#
3* The unilateral action of the defaulting State
cannot create a state of war; it merely entitles the other
Members of the League to resort to acts of war or to de
clare themselves in a state of war with the Covenant-breek
ing State; but it Is in accordance with the spirit of the
Covenant that the League of Rations should attempt, at
least at the outset, to avoid war, and to restore peace by
economic pressure#
ll# It is the duty of each Member of the League to
decide for Itself whether a breach of the Covenant has been
committed. The fulfilment of their duties under Article 16
is required from Members of the League by the express terms
of the Covenant, and they cannot neglect them without breach
of their Treaty obligations#
5# All oases of breach of Covenant under Article 16
shall be referred to the Council as a matter of urgency at
the request of any Member of the League# Further, if e
breach of Covenant be committed, or if there arise a dan
ger of such breach being committed, the Secretary-Ceneral
shall at once give notice thereof to all the Members of the
Council# Upon receipt of such a request by a Member of the
League or of such a notice by the Secretary-General, the
Council will meet as soon as possible# The Council shall
summon representatives of the parties to the conflict and
of all States which are neighbors of the defaulting State,
or which normally maintain close economic relations with
it, or whose co-operation would be especially valuable for

L*R#0*J»S#S* jS, pp# 22—2l^#

126

the application of Article 16*
6 # If the Council la of opinion that a State has
been guilty of a breach of Covenant# the minutes of the
meeting at which that opinion is arrived at shall be Irnme*»
diately sent to all Members of the League# accompanied by
a statement of reasons and by an invitation to take action
accordingly* The fullest publicity shall be given to this
decision*
7# For the purpose of assisting it to enforce Art
icle 16# the Council may# if it thinks fit# be assisted by
a technical Committee* This Committee# which will remain
in permanent session as soon as the action decided on is
taken# may include# if desirable# representatives of the
State specially affected*
8* The Council shall recommend the date on which
the enforcement of economic pressure# under Article 16, is
to be begun# and shall give notice of that date to all the
Members of the League*
9* All States must be treated alike as regards the
application of the measures of economic pressure# with the
following reservations*
(a) It may be necessary to recommend the execution
of s p e d si measures by certain States*
(b) If it is thought desirable to postpone# wholly
or partially# in the case of certain States#
the effective application of the economic sanc
tions Isiid down in Article 16# such postpone
ment shall not be permitted except in so far as
it is desirable for the success of the common
plan of action# or reduces to a minimum the
losses and embarrassments which may be entailed
in the case of certain Members of the League by
the application of the sanctions.
lO.lIt is not possible to decide beforehand, and in
detail# the various measures of an economic# commercial#
and financial nature to be taken in each ease where economic
pressure is to be applied*

When the case arises# the Council shall recommend
to the Members of the League a plan for joint action*
11# The interruption of diplomatic relations may#
in the first place# be limited to the withdrawal of the
heads of Missions*
12* Consular relations may possibly be maintained*
13* For the purposes of the severance of relations
between persons belonging to the Covenant-breaking State
and persons belonging to other States Members of the League#
the test shall be residence and not nationality*
llu In cases of irolonged application of economic
pressure# measures of increasing stringency may be taken.
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The cuttlng-off of the food «upplles of the civil population
of the defaulting State shall be regarded as an extremely
drastic measure which shall only be applied if the other
measures available are clearly Inadequate»
15* Correspondence and all other methods of commun*
Ication shall be subjected to special regulations»
16» Humanitarian relations shall be continued»
17# Efforts should be made to arrive at arrange
ments which would ensure the co-operation of States nonKambere of the League In the measures to be taken»
18# In special circumstances and in support of eco
nomic measures to be taken» it may become advisables
(ft) to establish an effective blockade of the sea
board of the Covenant-breaking States
(b) to entrust to some Members of the League the
execution of the blockade operations#
19# The Council shall urge upon all the States Mem
bers of the League that their Governments should take the
necessary preparatory measures» abpve all of a legislative
character# to enable them to enforce at short notice the
necessary measures of economic pressure#
Resolutions adopted by the Co-ordination Committee# First
Session# October 11-19# 1935^

(a) Declaration adopted by the Co-ordination Committee on
October lU# 1935
MUTUAL SUPPORT

With ft view to facilitating for the Governments of
the Members of the League of Rations the execution of their
obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant# it is recog
nised that any proposals for action under Article 16 are
made on the basis of the following provisions of that articlet
'The Members of the League agree# further# that
;they will mutually support one another in the fin
ancial and econoBiio measures which are taken under
this article# in order to minimise the loss and
inconvenience resulting from the above measures#

^L.W.O.J.S.3.

Dp, 11-27.
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end that they will mutually support one another in
resisting any special measures aimed at one of their
number by the Covenant-breaking State#^
(b) Resolution adopted by the Co-ordination Committee on
October 16^ 1935
EXECUTIOII OF OBLIGATION'S WHICH PLOW FROM ARTICLE! 16 OP THE
COVENANT

The Committee of Co-ordination,
Considering that it is important to ensure rapid
and effective application of the measures which have been
and may subsequently be proposed by the committeej
Considering that it rests with each country to ap
ply these measures in accordance with its public law and,
in particular, the powers of its Government in regard to
execution of treaties*
Calls attention to the fact that the Members of the
League, being bound by the obligations which flow from Art
icle 16 of the Covenant, are under a duty to take the nec
essary steps to ens,ble them to carry out these obligations
with all requisite rapidity#
(c) Proposal I, adopted by the Co-ordination Committee on
October 11, 1935
EXPORT OF ARMS, AHMCNITIOH, AHD IKPLEîlEMS OF WAR

With a view to facllitstlng for the Governments of
the Members of the League of Rations the execution of their
obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant, the following
measures should be taken forthwith*
1. The Governments of the Members of the L e a g u e of
Rations which are enforcing at the moment measures to pro
hibit or restrict the exportation, re-exportation, or tran
sit of arms, munitions, and implements of war to Ethiopia
will annul these measures immediately*
2* The Governments of the Members of the League of
Rations will prohibit iimnediately the exportation, re-ex
portation, or transit to Italy or Italian possessions of
arms, munitions, and implements of war enumerated in the
attached list#
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3# Tbô Oovernmonts of tho M^mbors of fch© League of
Hâtions will take such steps aa may be neoessary to secure
that arms# munitions# and Implements of war enumerated in
the attached list# exported to countries other then Italy#
will not be re-exported directly or indirectly to Italy or
to Italian possessions*
k* The measures provided for in paragraph 2 and 3
are to apply to contracts in process of execution.
Each Government la requested to inform the oonmlttee through the Secretary-General of the League within the
shortest possible time of the measures which It has taken
in conformity with the above provisions#
ARTICLES COHSIDSHEi) A S A RMS# Âîl^OTïITIOK# A H D
IWLTCHTS

OF WAR

Category I#
1* Rifles and carbines and their barrels#
2# Maohine«*guns# automatic rifles# and machinepistols of all calibres and their barrels#
3* Guns# howitzers# and mortars of ell calibres#
their mountings# barrels# and recoil mechanlsms#
I4# Ammunition for the arms enumerated under 1 and
2 above; filled and unfilled projectiles for the arms enu^
merated under 3 above# and prepared propellant charges for
these arms#
$# Grenades# bombs# torpedoes# and mines# filled or
unfilled# and apparatus for their use or discharge#
6# Tanks# armoured vehicles# and armoured trains#
Armor-plate of all kinds*
Category II#
Vessels of war of all kinds# Including aircrr^ftcarriers and submarines#
Category III#
1# Aircraft# assembled or dismantled# both heavier
and lighter than air# and their propellers or elr-sorews#
fuselages# aerial-gun mounts and frames# hulls, tall units#
and under-carriage units#
2# Alrcrsft-engines*
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Category IV*
He7olvera and automatic poatols of a weight In ex**
ceas of X pound 6 ounces(63O grammes) and ammunition there*
for*
Category V#
1* Flame-*throwers and ell other projectors used for
chenLical or Incendiary warfare*
2* Mustard gas* Lewistlte* ethyldlohloraralne#
methyldichlorarslne* and all other products destined for
chemical or Incendiary warfare*
3t Powder for war purposes* and explosives*
(e) Proposal II* adopted by the Co-ordination Committee on
October 1L» 1935

FIÎ«^AÎsiClAL i'l£ASUa£S
With a view to facilitating for the Governments of
the Members of the League of Katlons the execution of their
obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant* the following
measures should be taken forthwith:
The Governments of the Members of the League of
Katlons will forthwith take ell measures necessary to ren
der impossible the following opérationst
1* All loans to or for the Italian Government and
all subscriptions to loans Issued in Italy or elsewhere by
or for the Italian Government;
2* All banking or other credits to or for the Ital
ian Government and any further execution by advance* over
draft* or otherwise of existing contracts to lend directly
or indirectly to the Italian Government;
3# All loans to or for any public authority* person*
or corporation in Italian territory and all subscriptions
to such loans issued In Italy or elsewhere;
I4.* All banking or other credits to or for any pub
lic authority* person* or corporation in Italian territory
and any further execution by advance* overdraft* or other
wise of existing contracts to lend directly or indirectly
to such authority* person* or corporation;
5 . All Issues of shares o;r other capital flottations
for any public authority* person* or corporation in Italian
territory and all subscriptions to such issues of shares or
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capital flotations In Italy or elsewhere;
6 # The Governments will take all measures necessary
to render impossible the transactions mentioned In para<«
graphs 1-*S whether effected directly or through intermedia#
arias of whatsoever nationality#
The Governments are Invited to put in operation at
once such of the measures recommended as can be enforced
without fresh legislation# and to take all practicable steps
to secure that the measures recommended are completely put
into operation by October 31» 1935* Any Governments which
find it impossible to secure the requisite legislation by
that date are requested to inform the Committee# through
the S©cretary«#G©nerali of the date by which they expect to
be able to do so#
Each Government is requested to inform the Commit
tee» through the Secretary-General of the League» within
the shortest possible time of the measures which it has
taken in conformity with the above provisions*
(f) Proposal III» adopted by the Co-ordination Committee on
October 19» 1935
PROHIBITION OF IMPORTATION OF ITALIAN GOODS

With a view to facilitating for the Governments of
the Members of the League of Nations the execution of their
obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant» the following
measures should be taken;
1# The Governments of the Members of the League of
Nations will prohibit the Importation into their territories
of all goods (other than gold or silver bullion and coin)
consigned from or grown» produced» or manufactured in Italy
or Italian possessions, from whatever place arriving;
2* Goods grown or produced in Italy or Italian pos
sessions which have been subjected to some process in ani»
other country» and goods manufactured partly in Italy or
Italian possessions and partly In another country will be
considered as falling within the scope of the prohibition
unless 25 per cent# or more of the value of the goods at
the time when they left the place from which they were last
consigned la attributable to processes undergone since the
goods lest left Italy or Italian possessions;
3* Goods, the subject of existing contracts, will
not be excepted from the prohibition;
I4.# Goods en route at the time of Imposition of the
prohibition will be excepted from its operf»tion# In giving
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effect to this provision Governments may# for convenience
of administration# fix an appropriate date^ having regard
to the normal time necessary for transport from Italy# after
which goods will become subject to the prohibition;
$é Personal belongings of travelers from Italy or
Italian possessions may also be excepted from its operas
tlOD#
Having regard to the importance of collective and,
so far as possible, airaultanéous action In regard to the
measures recommended, each Government is requested to in-*
form the Co-ordination Committee# through the SecretaryGeneral# as soon as possible# and not later than October 28#
of the date on which it could be ready to bring these meas
ures into operation# The Co-ordination CoBunittee will meet
on October 31 for the purpose of fixing# in the light of
the replies received# the date of the coming into force of
the said measures.
(g) Proposal IV# adopted by the Co-ordination Committee on
October 19# 193$
EMBARGO OSi CERTAIN EXPORTS TO ITALY
With a view to facilitating for the Governments of
the Members of the League of Nations the execution of their
obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant, the follow
ing measures should be takeni
1, The Governments of the Members of the League of
Nations will extend the application of paragraph 2 of Pro
posal No. 1 of the Co-ordination Coramlttea to the follow
ing articles as regards their exportation and re-exporta
tion to Italy and Italian possessions# which will accord
ingly be prohibited;
(a) Horses# mules# donkeys, camels# and all other
transport animals;
(b) Rubber;
(e) Bauxite, aluxftlnlum and alumina (aluminium oxide),
iron ore# ana scrap iron;
Chromium, manganese# nickel# titanium#
tungsten# vsnadlum# their ores and ferro-alloys
(and also ferro-molybdenum, ferro-eilloon, ferrosilico-mancranese# and ferro-sillco-mangsnese
aluminium);
Tin and tineore*
list (c) above includes all crude forms of the min
erals and metals mentioned and their ores# scrap, and alloys;
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2# The Governments of the Meiobere of the League of
Katlons will take such steps as may be necessary to secure
that the articles mentioned in paragraph 1 above exported
to countries other than Italy or Italian possessions will
not be re-exported directly or indirectly to Italy or to
Italian possessions;
3* The measures provided for in paragraphs 1 and
2 above are to apply to contracts in course of execution;
Goods en route at the time of imposition of the
prohibition will be excepted from its operation# In giving
effect to this provision Governments may, for convenience
of administration, fix an appropriate date, having regard
to the normal time necessary for transport to Italy or
Italian possessions, after which goods will become subject
to the prohibition#
Having regard to the importance of collective and,
so far as possible, simultaneous action in regard to the
measures recommended, each Government is requested to in
form the Co-ordination Committee, through the SecretaryGeneral, as soon as possible, and not later than October 28,
of the date on which it could be ready to bring these meas
ures into operation. The Committee of Co-ordination' will
meet on October 31 for the purpose of fixing, in the light
of the replies received, the date of the coming into force
of the said measures#
The attention of the Co-ordination Conmilttee has
been drawn to the possible extension of the above proposal
to a certain number of other articles# It entrusts the
Committee of Eighteen with the tssk of making any suitable
proposals to Governments on this subject#
(h) Proposal V, adopted by the Co-ordination Committee on
October 19, 1935
ORGANISATIOK OF W T U k t

SHPPGHT

The Co-ordination Committee draws the special at
tention of all Governments to their obligations under para
graph 3 of Article 16 of the Covenant, according to which
the Meïiibers of the League undertake mutually to support one
another in the application of the economic and financial
measures taken under this article#
I# With a view to carrying these obligations into
effect the Governments of the Members of the League of
Nations wills
(a) Adopt immediately measures to ensure that no
action taken as a result of Article 16 will
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deprive any country applying aanotlons of auch
advantages aa the commercial agreements con«
eluded by the participating States with Italy
afforded it through the operation of the most*
favoured*natlon clause;
(b) Take appropriate steps with & view to replac*
ing# within the limits of the requirements of
their respective countries, imports from Italy
by the iir^ort of similar products from the par-'
tlclpating States;
(c) Be willing^ after the application of economic
sanctions, to enter Into negotiations with any
participating country which has sustained a
loss, with a view to increasing the sale of
goods so as to offset any loss of Italian mar^
kets which the application of sanctions may
have Involved;
(d) In cases in which they have suffered no loss
in respect of any given commodity, abstain from
demanding the application of eny uaost-favoured*
nation clause in the case of fny privileges
granted under paragraphs (b) and (e) in respect
of that commodity*
II* With the above objects, the Governments will,
if necessary, with the assistance of the Committee of Eight
een, study, in particular, the possibility of adopting with
in the limits of their existing obligations, and taking in*
to consideration the annexed opinion of the legal sub*com
mittee of the Co-ordination Committee, the following meas
ures;
(1) The increase by all appropriate measures of
their imports in favour of such countries as
may have suffered loss of Italian markets on
account of the application of sanctions;
(2) In order to facilitate this increase, the tak
ing into consideration of the obligations of
mutual support and of the advantages which the
trade of certain States Members of the League
of Nations, not participating in the sanctions,
would obtain from the application of these sanc
tions, in order to reduce by every appropriate
means and to an equitable degree imports coming
from these countries;
(3) The promotion, by all means in their power, of
business relations between firms interested in
the sale of goods in Italian markets which have
been lost owing to the application of sanctions
and firms normallv importing such goods;
{l^y Assistance generally In the organisation of the
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International marketing of good» with a view
to offsetting any loss of Italian markets which
the application of sanctions may beve involved#
% e y will also examine, under the same
conditions, the possibility of financial or
other measures to supplement the commercial
measures In so far as these latter may not
sure sufficient International mutual support#
III* The Co^'ordinatlon Committee requests the Gom^
mlttee of Eighteen to afford^ if necessary, to the Govern-*
ment» concerned the assistance contemplated at the begin
ning of Part II of the present proposal#
APPLICATION OF THE KO m T-Fà VOI?K2SD-Nâ TION CLAUSE
1# The Legal Suo-Gonmlttee has been asked to ad
vise whether a country participating in the sanctions which
at presehtf under the most-favoured-nation clause, benefits
by concessions made to Italy under conaneroial treaties with
other States which are participating in the sanctions can
continue to do so when the sanctions have resulted in sus
pension of the concessions made to Italy#
The Sub-Committee is of the following opinloni
The most-favoured-nation clause cannot give a right
to continued enjoyment of the advantages in question, since
application of most-favoured-nation treatment depends upon
the existence of a particular state of things# It is,
nevertheless. In conformity with the spirit of Article 26,
paragraph 3, of the Covenant that the advantages should
continue to be accorded independently of the meat-favoured-*
nation clause, for one could hardly conceive that the States
participating in the sanction», which are under an obliga
tion to support one another mi tually, should proceed to
render their economic relations with one another more dif
ficult than before#
Tho Sub-Committee considers that this view might
advantageously be expressed in the proposal dealing with
economic sanctions by the insertion therein of a provision
to the following effect%
•States participating in the sanctions which,
in virtue of most-favoured-nstion treatment, have
up to the present been obtaining from other parti
cipating State» advantages or benefits accorded by
the latter to Italy, of which Italy will bo tempo
rarily deprived through the application of sanctions,
will continue to enjoy such advantages and conces
sions on the new ground of the mutual support which
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tho Member8 of the League of Katlons are bound to
afford one another under Article 16, paragraph 3»
of the Covenant*^
2* The Legal 8ub-Committee has been asked to ad
vise whether it Is legally maintainable that countries en
titled to the benefit of the most-favoured-nation clause
would nevertheless not be Justified in claiming for them
selves the advantages of preferential treatment accorded,
temporarily and for the duration of the sanctions only, by
one of the participating States to the goods of another
participating State whoso exports had been specially re
stricted as the result of the sanctions*
The Sub-Coïtffîiltte© is of tho following opinion:
The loost-fnvoired-nation clause would not justify
the extension of the advantages in question to third States*
The reasons are, first, that such advantages would have an
exceptional as well as a temporary character and would be
the consequence of a special obligation existing between
the States concerned in virtue of Article 16, paragraph 3^
of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and, secondly,
that the most-favoured-natlon clause is a provision pecu
liar to commercial treaties, which are the treaties in
which it is found, and, accordingly, is one which must be
interpreted as not contemplating economic relations of so
exceptional a nature as those which are here under consid
eration*
(i) Text approved by the Co-ordination Committee on Octo
ber 19» 1935
COMIOTICATION TO STATES K0K-MEMB23S OF THE
LÎ3AGUE OF NATIONS
The Chairman of the Committee of Co-ordination of
measures to bo taken under Article 16 of the Covenant h^s
the honour to transmit herewith to States non-members of
the League, in accordance with the decision of the Co-ordi
nation Committee formed as the result of the recormiendation
adopted by the Assembly on October 10, the principal recent
documents in the Italo-Ethîonîan dispute, including the min
utes of the Council of October 7» the minutes of the Assem
bly of October 9 to 11, and the recommendations of the Co
ordination Committee*
He is instructed to add that the Governments repre
sented on the Co-ordination Committee would welcome any com
munication which any non-member State may deem it proper to
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make or notification of any action which it may bo taking
in tha olrcumatancos»
Resolutions adopted by the Co-ordinafclon Committee, Second
Session, October 31-Hoveiaiber 2, 1935^
Resolution adopted by the Co-»ordination Corinnltbee on
November 2, 193i>
OUTSTANDING CLAIMS
The Members of the League of Nations participating
in the measures taken In regard to Italy under Article 16
of the Covenant,
Having regard. In particular# to Proposal III, un
der which they have agreed to prohibit as from November 18
all imports consigned from Italy or her possessions;
I* Consider that the debts now payable by Italy to
thorn# under clearing agreements or any other arrangements,
the payment of which becomes impossible by reason of the
aforesaid prohibition, will remain valid at their present
value notwithstanding any offers of payment in kind that
may be made by Italy or any action that might be taken by
her against the creditor States;
II# Recognize:
(a) That, on the discontinuance of the measures
taken in regard to Italy under Article 16 of
the Covenant, they should support one another
In order to ensure that Italy discharges her
obligations to the creditor States as she should
have done if she had not incurred the applica
tion of Article 16 of the Covenant;
(b) Furthermore, th'^t, if in the meantime particu
larly serious losses are sustained by certain
States owing to the suspension by Itmly of the
payment of the aforesaid debts, the mutual sup
port provided for by paragraph 3 of Article 16
will be specially given in order to make good
such losses by all appropriate measures#
The Committee on Mutual bupport will draw up a list

^L.y.O.J.S.S. Ili6, pp. 8-13.
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of the debts referrjftd to In paragraph I above, and will
examine the meaaurea contemplated in paragraph 11(b) above*
Resolutions adopted by the Gomalttee of Eighteen, October 3XNovember 6, 1935
(a) Proposal 11(a), adopted by the Committee of Eighteen on
November 6, 1935
GLKAHINC AGREEMENTS
The Committee of Eighteen,
Entrusted by the Co-ordination Committee with the
task of following the execution of the proposals submitted
to Governments and empowered to make such new propos61a as
It may think desirable, proposes that the following meas
ures should be taken^
In order to render effective the application of
Proposal
and Proposal III, approved by the Committee
of Co-*ordination, Governments represented on the Co-ordi
nation Committee will-îé (a) Prohibit, as from November 18, the accept
ance of any new deposit of lire into the Italian
clearing account in payment for exports to Italy,
and, in consequence,
(b) Suspend to the extent necessary the opera-*
tion of any clearing or payments agreement that
they may have with ItRly by or befdre November

18;
II# Take, if need be, the necessary steps to ensure
that the purchase price of Italian products al
ready imported, or to be imported, in respect
of which payment has not yet been made, shall
be lodged in a national account, the resources
of which will, if necessary, be employed for the
settlement of claims arising from their exports*
Each Government is requested to Inform the Go-ordlnatlcn Committee through the Secretary-General of the League,
within the shortest possible time, of the measures which it
has taken in cônformity with the above provisions.

^L.y.O.J.S.S. Ih6, pp, Ji.6-50,
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(b) Proposal Ilî(a)^ adopted by the Committee of Eighteen

on Kovember 6^ 193?
BOOKS, NEWSPAPERS, &c.

The CoBmilttee of Eighteen,
Having been Instructed by the Co-ordination Commit
tee to follow the execution of the proposals submitted to
Governments, and being empowered to make such further pro
posals as it may think expedient*
Proposes thrt, as an exception to Proposal III, the
prohibition to import goods consigned from Italy or Italian
possessions should not be extended to books, newspapers, and
periodicals, maps and cartographical productions, or print
ed or engraved music*
(c) Proposal
adopted by the Committee of Eighteen
on November 6, 1935
EMBARGO ON CERTAIN EXPORTS TO XTiVLY

In the execution of the mission entrusted to it
under the last paragraph of Proposal IV, the Committee of
Eighteen submits to Governments the following proposal*
It is expedient that) the measures of embargo pro
vided for In Proposal IV should be extended to the follow
ing articles as soon as the conditions necessary to render
this extension effective have been realized:
Petroleum and its derivatives, by-products, and
residues ;
plg-ironjlron and steel (including alloy steels),
cast, forged, rolled, drawn, stamped, or pressed;
Coal (including anthracite and lignite), coke and
their agglomerates, as well as fuels derived
therefrom*
If the replies received by the Committee to the
present proposal and the information at its disposal war
rant it, the Committee of Eighteen will propose to Govern
ments A date for bringing into force the mesauraa mentioned
above #
(d) Proposal IV(b), edorted by the Committee of Eighteen
on November 6, 1935

iho
IIÎDIHF.CT S W P L Y

The Coimnittee of Eighteen^
Entrusted by the Co-ordination Coiaralttee with the
task of following the execution of the proposals subraltted to Governments and empowered to make such new proposal#
as It may think desirable, is of opinion that the follow
ing measures should be taken:
In order to render effective the provisions of
point 2 of Proposal iVj Governments represented
on the Co-ordination Committee will tak©^ as re
gards the export of prohibited products, such
measures as are necessary to verify, by all
means in their power, the destination of such
products#
Those Governments which do not immediately restrict
their exports of these articles will keep under
constant review the volume and direction of such
export# In the ev^nt of an abnormal Increase
in this export, they will immediately take such
steps as may be necessary to prevent supplies
reaching Italy or Italian possessions by Indi
rect routes.
Each Government is requested to Inform the Co-ordi
nation Committee, through the Secretary-General of the
League, within the shortest possible time, of the measure#
which it has taken in conforznity with the above provisions.
(e) Resolution adopted by the Committee of Eighteen on
November 6, 1935
CONTRACTS ÎH COURSE OF EXECUTION
The Committee of Eighteen instructs a Sub-Commit
tee consisting of representatives of the United Kingdom,
France, Kexlco, loiand, Roimania, and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics to make proposals to the interested
Government# on its behalf in regard to those oontraota-othor than those In respect of which p&iment had been made
in full by October 19, 1933-*-which might be executed by way
of exception to paragraph No. 3 of Proposai III#
In making its proposals, the Sub-Committee will be
guided b y the following principlesi
(a^ Exception to be made only in the case of con
tract# concluded b y a State or institution

lUi
belonging to a State or entirely subject to Its
administrative control, or for their account,
prior to October 19, 1935# which relate to goods
of essential Importance to the importing Statej
(b) Not less than 20 per cent, of the total sums
due under the contract to have been paid by
October 19# 1935;
(o) Contracts stipulating for payment in goods# the
export of which to Italy is prohibited under
Proposal IV# not to have the benefit of the ex-*
ceptlon in question;
(d) Governments to furnish the Sub-Commlttee# not
later thf*n November 1C, with full details of
each contract (nature of goods# total sums due#
amount psld prior to October 19# 1935# and
amount outstanding on November 10# 1935)*
The Sub-Committee will draw up# not later than
November 12# the final list of contracts in the case of ■
which an exception appears to it to be justified# and will
communicate the list forthwith for information to the Gov
ernments represented on the Co-ordination Committee*
Outline of an Agreed Settlement of the Itelo-Ethlopian Con
flict# December 10, 1935^
I* Exchange of Territories
The Governments of the United Kingdom and France
agree to recommend to His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia
the acceptance of the following exchanges of territory be
tween Ethiopia and Italy,
(a) Tigres Cession to Italy of eastern Tigre# ap
proximately limited on the south by the River Gheva and on
the west by a line running from north to south# passing be
tween Aksum (on the Ethiopien side) and Adowa (on the
Italian aide),
(b) Rectification of frontiers between the Danakll
country and Eritrea, leaving to the south of the boundary
line Auasa and the extent of Eritrea territory necessary
to give Ethiopia an outlet to the sea to be defined below,
(c) Rectification of frontiers between the Ogaden
and Italien Somaliland, Starting from the tri-junction
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point between the frontiers of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Italian
Somaliland, the new Itslo**Ethioplan front 1er "would follow
a general north-easterly direction, cutting the Wobl Shoball
at Iddldolo, leaving Gorahal to the east, WarandRb to the
west, and meeting the frontier of British Somaliland whore
it intersects the U5th meridian.
The rights of the tribes of British Somaliland to
the use of grazing areas and wells situated in the terri
tories granted to Italy by this delimitation should be
guaranteed,
(d)
Ethiopia will receive an outlet to the sea with
full sovereign rights# It seems that this outlet should be
formed preferably by the cession, to which Italy would agree,
of the port of Assab and of a strip of territory giving ac
cess to this port along the frontier of French Somaliland,
The United Kingdom and French Governments will en
deavour to obtain from the Ethiopian Government guarantees
for the fulfilment of the obligations which devolve upon
them regarding slavery and arms traffic in the territories
acquired by them#
lit Zone of Economic Expansion and Settlement
The United Kingdom and French Governments will use
their'influence at Addis Ababa and at Geneva to the end
that the formation in Southern Ethiopia of a zone of econom
ic expansion and settlement reserved to Italy shoula be
accepted by His Majesty the Emperor and approved by tho
League of Nations,
The limits of this zone would be* on the east, the
rectified frontier between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland;
on the north, the 8th parallel; on the west, the 35th meri
dian; on the south, the frontier between Ethiopia and
Kenya,
Within this zone, which would form an integral part
of Ethiopia, Italy would enjoy exclusive economic rights
which might be aoministerod by a privileged company or by
any other like organization, to which would be recognizedsubject to the acquired rights of natives and forelgners-the right of ownership of unoccupied territories, the mono
poly of the exploitation of mines, forests, 6cc, This or
ganization would be obliged to contribute to the economic
equipment of the country and to devote a portion of its
revenues to expenditure of a social character for the bene
fit of the native population.
The control of the Ethiopian administration in the
zone would be exercised, under the sovereignty of the Emper
or, by the services of the scheme of assistance drawn up

ll|3
by the League of îîations# Italy woull take à preponderate^
Ing, but not an exclualve, share in these services^ which
would be under the direct control of one of the principal
advisers attached to the Central Covernzcont. The princi
pal adviser in quostlon, who night be of Italian nation
ality# would be the aasist3.ut, for the affairs in question,
of the Chief Adviser delegated by the League of Nations to
assist the Emperor. The Chief Adviser would not be a sub
ject of one of the Powers borcit-ring on Ethiopia,
The services of the scheme of assistance, in/the
capital as well as In the resem^ed zone, would regard it as
one of their essential duties to ensure the safety of
Italian subjects and the free development of their enters
prises.
The Government of the United Kingdom and tho French
Government will willingly endeavour to ensure that this or
ganization, the details of y/hich mist be elaborated by the
League of Nations, fully safeguards the interests of Italy
in this region.
The foregoing text is the text which was coirimuniGated to the Italian Government.
Two modifications wore
Introduced Into the text communicated to the Ethiopian
Gov®i*nment i
1, The first paragraph of Section II was drafted
as follows:
’The United Kin^'^dora and French Governments
recommend Hie Kajeety the Emperor to ocoept, and
will U3© their influonca to secure the approvrJ of
the League of Nations of, the formation in L:*outhern
Ethiopia of a zone of économie expansion and set
tlement reserved to Italy.’
2» A few words were aided to the end of the first
sentence of the fourth paragraph of the same Section II.
These words are as follows:
’The control of the Ethiopian administration in
the zone would be exercised, under the sovereignty
of the Emperor, by tho services of the scheme of
assistance drawn up by the League of Nations and
already accepted by the Emperor as extending over
the whole area of Ethiopian administration,’

BIELIOOHAFHY

Primary Sources

I* Public Documents

League of Nations^ Oounoil* Official Journalg Vola» 16^17#
Geneva: PubllofRtion Department of the League of
Nations^ 1935- 1936#
League of Nations» Asse^bl;^*

Official Journal^

Special

Supplemenfe Mo. 6# Heaolutiona an4 Ee.ooitmendations
Adopted by the Aseembly during its Second Session#
Geneva : publleatlou
par W e n t of the League of
Nation»» 1921#
League of Nations» Aaeembly# Official Journal» Special
Supplement Nos. 138*1 W w
Records of the Sixteenth
Ordinary Session of the Asseaibly» Geneva: Publi
cation Department of the League of Nations» 1935#
League of Nations, Assembly.

Official Journal, Special

Supplement Koa. Ili5-U7» Dispute Between Ethiopia
and itaiy# Geneve: Publication Départaient of the
League of Nations» 1935#
League of Nations» Assembly* Official Journal, Special
Supplement No a. lt;S*50. Dispute Between Ethiopia
and Italy. Geneva: Publication Department of the
League of Nations» 1936.
League of Nations» Assembly. Official Journal, Special
Supplementt No. l5l# Records of the Sixteenth
Ordinary Session of the assembly. Geneva: Publi
cation. Department of the League of Npttions» 1936
League of Nations» Assembly#

Official Journal » Special

Supplement Nos. l>5-63# dacorda of the Seventeenth
Ordinary Session of the Ascembly. Geneva: Publi
cation Department of the League of Nations» 1936.
II# Private Documents

Cecil» Lord Robert.

A Grest Experiment.

1941.

145

London: J. Cope»

ll{-6

Churchill, Winston S#
The Catherin/î Storm#
----ton Mifflin C o # 7 T ? P #
Ciano, Qaleaaao# The Ciano Dlerlea#
Doubleday & Co*, 19^5.

Bostons noupch-

Garden City, îîevr York s

Ciano# Ûaleasao,
Diplomatie Papers# Malcolm Muggeridga
(ed,) tran* b y Stuart Hood, tondons Odhama Press

mô*
Secondary Works

I# Books

Borgese, Ouiseppo,Antonio* Goliaths The March of Fascism#
lîew York; Oxford Univers it y 1 re sa "lÿjG «
Carr, Edward îîollett# The T fcnty Years Crisis# 1919-1939♦
London: Macmillan & Go#, 19^2.''
Gantenbeen, James Watson y(ed»). Documentary Bacteround of
World War II, 193l~kl# k W Yor&s Columb 1a Univer-*
sity Press, 19Îiü/"" "
Heald Stephen (ed#)» Documents on International Affairs#
1935# Vol* 11
1i W t e " % I T n W r n
Affairs# London: Oxford University Press, 1937*
Eighley, Albert E# The Actions of the States Members of
the League of Nations in Application oF'San'c^ions
Against 11a 1y#**" 1 9 ^ 5 # Doctoral Dissertation,
University of Geneva# Geneva: Journal de Geneva,
1938*
Macarlty, Maxwell* Italy*a Foreign and Colonial Policy,
19111-37 ♦ London and" kew York % Oxford Univer sity

pFes57^1938,
MacCallum, Elisabeth P# Rivalries in Ethiopia# World Affairs.
Pamphlet Ko# 12, Lew YorkTl^orld Peace Foundation,
1935#
Bamier, Lewis Bernstein#
lan Co., 1950#

^u.roj:e in Decay#

London: Macmil

iw
Salverrxlnej Gaotuno,. Frelude to World War I I #
Kew York? Doubleday
19Slu
Schuman* Fï*ederlck L*
Europe on the Eve*
A* Knopf* 1933^
~

Garden Clty^

Kew York; Alfred

’Toynbee* Arnold J * Ab 5& si nl a and Italy; Survey of Inter-*
national Affairs. 1935* Vol* ll* 'London: Oxford
University frees* 193^#

Villarl* Luigi* Itall an foreign Affairs Under Mussolini*
New Yorkt Devln-»A<îsïr-îo ** "l95^>*
Walters* Frank F*
A History of the League of Nations*
2 vole* Ho*yal Institute of ïnt ornat 1onal AX^Ïair@*
London; Oxford University Press* 1952*
Wark* Ernest.

Ethiopia* A

In Europe*

New Concord;

The AutSoV, 193p ^
Welles* Sumner#
Seven Decisions that Shaped History,
iw York; Harper & Bros»*’ 1 4 ^ 1 •
Wiskemann* Elizabeth*
The Home^Berlin Axis#
Oxford University Ires'»*" 1 9 W *

New York:

II» Article»

Dean* V. M# ”Th© League aijd the Italo-Ethlopian Crisis"*
Foreijyn Policy Heporta* XI (November 6* 1935)*

5ïFârr

League of Nations*

Monthly bummery» Vol. XVI* Noa* 1 -»1 2 «

Geneva; Leeg u ^ o f wations Information Section* 1935 #
League of Nation»# Monthly Summary* Vol. XVII* Noe# 1^12#
Geneva: Le ague of Nations Information Section* 1 9 3 6 »
Le Fur* Louis#
"The League of Nations and the Present
Criai»** International Conciliation* Ko* 303
(October* 1934)» 3&6^1^3.
Lowell* A. L« "Altaroatives Before the League"* Foreign
Affairs* XV (October* 1 9 3 6 ), 1 0 2 - 1 1 .

Spenoer, J* H#
**The I tail an-Ethiopian Disputa and the
Leapcue of 3)iatlons"# American Journal of I n t e m a tlonal L a w , X U I (October, 1 9 1 7 7 7 ^ 1 4 ^ 1 »
Wright, vcuincy.
"The Test of Aggression in the ItaloEthioplan W a r ”* American Journpl of International
L a w . XXX (January, 193Ô )
Zlzamem, Alfred E*
”The League *s Eahdling cf the ItaloAbysslnlan Dispute”, International Affairs, XIV
(Kovember, 1935),
Ziwraem, Alfred B.
”Tho Testing of the League”, Poreip;n
Affrira, XIV (April, 1936), 373-86.

